The 'Battle of Singapore' was the culmination of the Japanese 'E' (i) operation to take Malaya and resulted in the Japanese seizure of Singapore island and its great naval base from British and allied forces (8/15 February 1942).

Singapore was the most important British military base and port in South-East Asia, and and had been of great significance in the planning and implementation of British strategy for the Far East in the period between the two world wars.

Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s Japanese 25^th Army had advanced with about 30,000 men to the south along the Malayan peninsula after their 8 December landings at Singora and Pattani in south-eastern Thailand and at Khota Bary in north-eastern Malaya. The British had erroneously believed Malaya’s jungle terrain to be impassable, which facilitated the speed of the Japanese advance as British defences were quickly outflanked. Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, commander of the Malaya Command, had some 85,000 British and allied troops at Singapore, although many units were below strength and most of them lacked combat experience. The British outnumbered the Japanese, but much of the water for the island’s large population was drawn from reservoirs on the mainland. As the Japanese approached the island, the British destroyed the causeway linking the island with the mainland, forcing the Japanese to plan and execute an improvised crossing of the Straits of Johore. Singapore was considered so important to the British position in the Far East that Prime Minister Winston Churchill instructed Percival to fight to the last man.

After they had reached the southern end of the Malay peninsula, off which lies Singapore, the Japanese attacked the weakest parts of the island’s defences and between 8 and 10 February established a pair of beach-heads, one in the north-west by two divisions on 8/9 February and the other in the north by one division during the night of 9/10 February. Percival had expected a crossing in the north and failed to reinforce the defenders in time. Communication and leadership failures beset the British and there were few defensive positions or reserves near the beach-heads. The Japanese advance continued and the British began to run short of supplies. By 15 February, about a million civilians in the city were crammed into the remaining 1% area held by the British and allied forces. Japanese aircraft steadily bombed the civilian water supply, and this was expected to fail within days. The Japanese were also almost at the end of their supplies and Yamashita wished to avoid costly urban fighting.

As a ruse, Yamashita demanded unconditional surrender and during that afternoon Percival ignored his orders and surrendered. About 80,000 British, Indian, Australian and local troops became prisoners of war, joining the 50,000 taken in Malaya, and many of these eventually died of neglect and abuse, and of the effects of forced labour. Three days after the British surrender, the Japanese began the Sook Ching purge, killing thousands of civilians. The Japanese held Singapore until the end of the war. About 40,000 Indian soldiers joined the anti-British Indian National Army and fought with the Japanese in the Burma campaign. Churchill called it the worst disaster in British military history. The combination of the sinking of the battleship Prince of Wales and battle-cruiser Repulse soon after the Japanese landings in Malaya, the fall of Singapore, and other defeats in 1942 severely undermined British prestige, and thus contributed to the end of British colonial rule in the region after the war.

During the period between the world wars, the UK had established a naval base in Singapore after the lapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1923. As part of the Singapore strategy, the base formed a key part of British defence planning for the region. Financial limitations had hampered construction efforts, and changing strategic circumstances had largely undermined the key premises behind the strategy by the time war had broken out in the Pacific. During 1940 and 1941, the Allies imposed a trade embargo on Japan in response to its campaigns in China and its 'Fu' (i) occupation of French Indo-China. The Japanese schemed their basic plan for the seizure of Singapore in July 1940. Intelligence gained late in 1940 and early in 1941 did not alter that plan but confirmed it in the minds of Japanese decision makers. On 11 November 1940, the German raider Atlantis captured the British steamer Automedon, which was carrying papers meant for Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British commander-in-chief in the Far East: the papers included information about the weakness of the Singapore base, and in December 1940 the Germans delivered copies of the papers to the Japanese. The Japanese had broken the British army’s codes and in January 1941, and the Second Department (the intelligence-gathering arm) of the Imperial Japanese army, read a message from Singapore to London complaining in much detail about the weak state of 'Fortress Singapore': the message was so frank in its admission of weakness that the Japanese initially suspected that the message was a British 'plant', for they believed that no officer would be so open in admitting weaknesses to his superiors. Thus it as only after they had cross-checked the message with the Automedon papers that the Japanese accepted it as genuine.

At this time Japan’s oil reserves were rapidly diminishing as a result of its military operations in China in combination with industrial consumption. In the latter half of 1941, the Japanese thus began to prepare to launch a war to seize vital resources if peaceful efforts to buy them failed. The planners created a broad scheme of manoeuvres that incorporated simultaneous attacks on the territories of the UK, the Netherlands and the USA. This would include landings in Malaya and Hong Kong as part of a general move to the south to secure Singapore, which was linked to Malaya by the Johore-Singapore Causeway, and then an invasion of the oil-rich area of Borneo and Java in the Dutch East Indies. An attack would also be delivered on the US naval fleet and base at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian islands group, as also would landings in the Philippine islands group and attacks on Guam, Wake island and the Gilbert islands group.A period of consolidation would follow, after which the Japanese planners intended to build up the defences of the captured territory by establishing a strong perimeter from the India/Burma frontier through to Wake island and via Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Britain and New Ireland, the Bismarck archipelago, and the Marshall and Gilbert island groups. This perimeter would be used to block Allied attempts to regain the lost territory and defeat their will to fight.

The 25^th Army invaded Malaya from Indo-China, moving into northern Malaya and Thailand by amphibious assault on 8 December 1941. This was virtually simultaneous with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which precipitated the USA’s entry into the war. Thailand resisted landings on its territory for only as much as eight hours before signing a ceasefire and then a Treaty of Friendship with Japan, later declaring war on the UK and the US. The Japanese then proceeded overland across the Thai/Malay border to attack Malaya. At this time, the Japanese began bombing Singapore.

The 25^th Army was resisted in northern Malaya by Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath’s Indian III Corps. Although the 25^th Army was outnumbered by the British and allied forces in Malaya and Singapore, the British did not take the initiative while Japanese commanders concentrated their efforts. The Japanese were superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination, tactics and experience. Conventional British military thinking was that the Japanese forces were inferior and characterised that the Malayan jungles as 'impassable', and the Japanese were thus repeatedly able to use this preconception to their advantage by outflanking hastily established defensive lines. Before the 'Battle of Singapore', the most resistance was met at the 'Battle of Muar', which involved Major General H. Gordon Bennett’s Australian 8^th Division and Brigadier H. C. Duncan’s Indian 45^th Brigade. The British troops left in the city of Singapore were essentially garrison forces.

At the start of the campaign, the British-led forces had only 164 first-line aircraft in Malaya and Singapore, and their only single-engined fighter type was the obsolete Brewster Buffalo, which was flown by one Royal New Zealand Air Force, two Royal Australian Air Force and two Royal Air Force squadrons. Along with other types, the Buffalo was considered inadequate for service in the European theatre, and major shortcomings included a slow rate of climb and the fuel system, which required the pilot to hand-pump fuel when flying at any altitude above 6,000 ft (1830 m). The Imperial Japanese army air force was more numerous and better trained than the poorly trained pilots and inferior equipment remaining in Malaya, Borneo and Singapore. The superiority of the Japanese fighters allowed the Japanese to establish an immediate air supremacy. Nonetheless, although outnumbered and outclassed, the Buffalo fighters were able to offer at least a measure of resistance, with RAAF pilots alone managing to shoot down at least 20 Japanese aircraft before the few survivors were withdrawn.

Force 'Z', comprising the battleship Prince of Wales, the battle-cruiser Repulse and four destroyers, departed to the north from Singapore on 8 December to oppose Japanese landings which were expected along Malaya’s eastern coast. Japanese land-based aircraft found and sank the two capital ships on 10 December, leaving Malaya’s eastern coast exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their amphibious landings. The Japanese forces quickly isolated, surrounded and forced the surrender of Indian units defending the coast. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Japanese advanced to the south through the Malayan peninsula, overwhelming the defences. The Japanese forces also used bicycle-mounted infantry and light tanks, allowing swift movement through the jungle. Having believed that the jungle was impenetrable, the British-led forces had no tanks and only a few armoured vehicles, and this placed them at a severe disadvantage.

Although more units, including some of the Australian 8^th Division, were committed to the campaign, the Japanese prevented them from regrouping. The Japanese overran towns and advanced toward Singapore, which was an anchor for the operations of the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command, the first Allied joint command of World War II. Singapore controlled the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. An ambush was sprung by the Australian 2/30^th Battalion on the main road at the Gemencheh river near Gemas on 14 January, inflicting many losses on the Japanese.

At Bakri, between 18 and 22 January, the Australian 2/19^th and 2/29^th Battalions and the Indian 45^th Brigade, the latter under the command of Lieutenant Colonel C. Anderson, repeatedly fought through Japanese positions before running out of ammunition near Parit Sulong. The survivors were forced to leave behind about 110 Australian and 40 Indian wounded, who were later beaten, tortured and murdered by Japanese troops during the Parit Sulong massacre. Of the total of more than 3,000 men in these units, only about 500 escaped. A determined counterattack by Lieutenant Colonel J. Parkin’s 5/11^th Sikh Regiment in the area of Niyor, near Kluang, on 25 January and an ambush around the Nithsdale Estate by the Australian 2/18^th Battalion on 26/27 January bought valuable time and permitted 'East' Force, based on Brigadier H. Taylor’s Australian 22^nd Brigade, to withdraw from eastern Johore). On 31 January, the last British-led forces crossed the causeway linking Johore and Singapore and engineers then blew it up.

During the weeks leading to the Japanese invasion of Singapore island, the British-led forces suffered a number of both subdued and openly disruptive disagreements among its senior commanders, as well as pressure from the Australian prime minister, John Curtin. The commander of the garrison, Percival had 85,000 men representing, at least on paper, a strength of slightly more than four divisions: of this total, 15,000 men were employed in supply, administrative or other non-combatant roles, while the other 70,000 were a mix of front- and second-line troops. There were 49 infantry battalions, of which 21 were Indian, 13 British, six Australian, four Indian States Forces assigned to airfield defence, three Straits Settlements Volunteer Force, and two Malayan. In addition, there were one Australian and two British machine gun battalions, and one British reconnaissance battalion. Major General M. Beckwith-Smith’s newly arrived British 18^th Division was at full strength but lacked experience and training. The rest of the force was of mixed quality, condition, training, equipment and morale.

Percival allocated to the two brigades of Bennett’s Australian 8^th Division responsibility for the western side of Singapore, including the prime invasion points in the north-west of the island. This was mostly mangrove swamp and jungle, broken by rivers and creeks. In the heart of this Western Area was RAF Tengah, Singapore’s largest airfield at the time. Brigadier H. Taylor’s Australian 22^nd Brigade was assigned a 10-mile (16-km) wide sector in the west, and Brigadier D. Maxwell’s Australian 27^th Brigade had responsibility for a 4,000-yard (3660-m) zone just to the west of the causeway. The infantry positions were reinforced by the recently arrived Australian 2/4^th Machine-Gun Battalion, and also under Bennett’s command was Brigadier G. Ballantine’s Indian 44^th Brigade.

Heath’s Indian III Corps included Major General B. Key’s Indian 11^th Division with reinforcements from the Indian 8^th Brigade, and Beckwith-Smith’s British 18^th Division, and was assigned the north-eastern sector, known as the Northern Area, which included the naval base at Sembawang. The Southern Area, including the main urban areas in the south-east, was commanded by Major-General F. Simmons with forces comprising elements of Brigadier G. C. R. Williams’s 1^st Malaya Brigade and the Straits Settlements Volunteer Force Brigade with Lieutenant Colonel I. Stewart’s Indian 12^th Brigade in reserve.

From 3 February, the British-led forces were shelled by Japanese artillery, and Japanese air attacks on Singapore intensified over the next five days. The artillery and air bombardments increased steadily, severely disrupting communications between units and their commanders and affecting preparations for the island’s defence. Using information derived from aerial reconnaissance, scouts, infiltrators and observation from high ground across the straits, such as Istana Bukit Serene and the Sultan of Johore’s palace, Yamashita and his staff derived an excellent picture of the British-led forces' positions. Yamashita and his officers stationed themselves at Istana Bukit Serene and the Johore state secretariat building to plan the invasion of Singapore island. Although advised by his senior military personnel that Istana Bukit Serene was an easy target, Yamashita was confident that the British-led forces would not attack the palace because it belonged to the Sultan of Johore, and Yamashita’s prediction was correct: despite the fact that the building was under observation by Australian artillery, permission to engage the palace was denied by Bennett.

It is a common misconception that Singapore’s 15-in (381-mm) Mk I naval guns were ineffective against the Japanese because they were sited to face south in order to defend the harbour against naval attacks and could not be traversed to face north. In fact, most of the guns could be trained to this direction, and were indeed fired at the invaders. The guns, which included one battery of three 15-in (381-mm) weapons and one with two 15-in (381-mm) guns, were however supplied mostly with armour-piercing shells and only few high explosive shells: the former were designed to penetrate the hulls of heavily armoured warships and were mostly ineffective against infantry. Military analysts later estimated that had the guns had been well supplied with high explosive shells, the Japanese attackers would have suffered heavy casualties, but also that the invasion would not have been prevented by this means alone.

Percival incorrectly estimated that the Japanese would land forces on the north-east side of Singapore island, ignoring advice that the north-west coast was a more likely point of attack as the Straits of Johore were here at their narrowest and that a series of river mouths provided cover for the launching of water craft. Percival’s erroneous assessment was enhanced by the deliberate movement of Japanese units in this sector to deceive the British. As such, a large portion of defence equipment and resources had been incorrectly allocated to the north eastern sector, where the most complete and freshest formation, the British 18^th Division, was deployed, while the incomplete Australian 8^th Division sector, with just two brigades, had no serious fixed defensive works or obstacles. To compound matters, Percival had ordered the Australians to defend forward so as to cover the waterway, yet this meant they were immediately committed in full to any fighting, limiting their tactical flexibility while also reducing their defensive depth. The two Australian brigades were subsequently allocated a very wide frontage of more than 11 miles (18 km) and were separated from each other by the Kranji river, a factor which precluded any possibility of rapid mutual support.

Yamashita had slightly oe than 30,000 men from three divisions: Lieutenant General Takuma Nishimura’s Imperial Guards Division, Lieutenant General Takuro Matsui’s 5^th Division and Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi’s 18^th Division. Also available in support was a light tank brigade. In comparison and as noted above, following the withdrawal from the Malayan peninsula Percival had about 85,000 men at his disposal: this figure 15,000 men in administrative service, and a large proportion of the other 70,000 men were semi-trained British, Indian and Australian reinforcements who had only recently arrived. Meanwhile, of those forces which had seen action during the previous fighting, the majority were under-strength and under-equipped.

In the days just before the Japanese invasion, patrols of the Australian 22^nd Brigade were sent across the Straits of Johor at night to gather intelligence. Three small patrols were sent on the evening of 6 February: one was spotted and withdrew after its leader had been killed and their boat had been sunk, and the other two managed to get ashore. Over the course of a day, the patrols found large concentrations of troops, although they were unable to locate any landing craft. The Australians suggested that these positions be shelled to disrupt the Japanese preparations, but the patrol reports were later ignored by the Malaya Command as being insignificant, based upon the belief that the real assault would come in the north-eastern rather than north-western sector.

The blowing of the causeway had delayed the Japanese attack for more than one week. Before the start of the main assault on them, the Australians were subjected to an intense artillery bombardment. Over a period of 15 hours from 23.00 on 8 February, Yamashita’s heavy artillery fired a bombardment of 88,000 shells along the straits, cutting telephone lines and isolating forward units. The British had the means to conduct counter-battery fire opposite the Australians, which would have caused casualties and disruption among the Japanese assault troops. The bombardment of the Australians was not seen as a prelude to attack, however, the Malaya Command believing that it would last several days and would later switch its focus to the north-east, despite the fact that the bombardment’s intensity was greater than anything the British-led forces had experienced thus far in the campaign. Thus no order was given to counter-bombard Japanese artillery positions and possible Japanese assembly areas.

Percival’s misappreciation of the situation was compounded during the evening of 7 February, when the Imperial Guards Division launched a feint assault on the extreme east of the front. This involved an attack toward Pulau Ubin island at the eastern end of the Straits of Johore, and served to divert attention away from the north-western sector in which the real assaults were to be made.

Shortly before 20.30 on 8 February, the first wave of Japanese troops from the 5^th Division and 18^th Division began crossing the Straits of Johore. The main weight of the Japanese force, about 13,000 men, from 16 assault battalions, with five in reserve, attacked the Australian 22^nd Brigade in the area of Sarimbun. The assault fell on the 2/18^th Battalion and the 2/20^th Battalion. Each of the Japanese divisions had some 150 barges and collapsible boats, sufficient for lifts of 4,000 men. During the first night 13,000 Japanese troops landed and were followed by another 10,000 after first light. The Australians numbered just 3,000 men and lacked any significant reserve.

As the landing craft closed on the Australian positions, machine gunners of the 2/4^th Machine Gun Battalion, interspersed among the infantry companies, opened fire. Spotlights had been placed on the beaches by a British unit to illuminate an invasion force on the water but many had been damaged by the earlier Japanese bombardment and no order was made to turn the others on. The initial wave was concentrated against the positions occupied by the 2/18^th Battalion and the 2/20^th Battalion around the Buloh river, as well as one company of the 2/19^th Battalion. Over the course of one hour, there was intense fighting on the right flank of the 2/19^th Battalion before its positions were overrun. Hidden by darkness and vegetation, the Japanese then advanced inland. The resistance of the 2/19^th Battalion’s company pushed the follow-on waves of Japanese craft to land around the mouth of Murai river, which resulted in the creation of a gap between the 2/19^th and 2/18^th Battalions. From there the Japanese launched two concerted attacks against the 2/18^th Battalion, which were met with massed fire before they overwhelmed the Australians by weight of numbers. Urgent requests for fire support made and throughout the night the 2/15^th Field Regiment fired more than 4,800 rounds.

Fierce fighting continued through the evening, but as a result of the terrain and darkness, the Japanese were able to disperse into the undergrowth, surround and overwhelm pockets of Australian resistance, or bypass them exploiting gaps in their thinly spread lines resulting from the area’s many rivers and creeks. By 00.00, the two Japanese divisions were able to fire star shells to indicate to their commander that they had secured their initial objectives, and by 01.00 they were well established. Over the course of two hours, the three Australian battalions attempted to to regroup, moving back to the east from the coast toward the centre of the island, and this retirement was completed mainly in good order. The 2/20^th Battalion managed to concentrate three of its four companies around the Namazie Estate, although one was left behind; the 2/18^th Battalion was able to concentrate only half its strength at Ama Keng, while the 2/19^th Battalion also moved back three companies, leaving a fourth to defend Tengah airfield. More combat followed in the early morning of 9 February and the Australians were pushed back still farther, with the 2/18^th Battalion pushed out of Ama Keng and the 2/20^th Battalion forced to pull back to Bulim, to the west of Bukit Panjong. Bypassed elements tried to break out and fall back to Tengah airfield to rejoin their units, and in the process suffered many casualties. Bennett attempted to reinforce the Australian 22^nd Brigade by moving the 2/29^th Battalion from the Australian 27^th Brigade area to Tengah, but before it could be used in an attempt to recapture Ama Keng, the Japanese launched another attack around the airfield and the 2/29^th Battalion was forced onto the defensive. The initial fighting cost the Australians many casualties, the 2/20^th Battalion losing 334 men killed and 214 wounded.

The continuing air campaign for Singapore had begun during the 'E' (i) invasion of Malaya. Early on 8 December, Singapore had been bombed for the first time by Japanese long-range aircraft, such as the Mitsubishi G3M2 'Nell' and the Mitsubishi G4M1 'Betty' twin-engined medium bombers, based in Japanese-occupied Indo-China. The bombers had struck the city centre as well as the Sembawang naval base and the northern airfields. For the rest of December there were false alerts and several infrequent and sporadic hit-and-run attacks on outlying military installations such as the naval base, but no raids on Singapore city. The next recorded raid on the city took place during the night of 29/30 December, and nightly raids followed for more than a week, accompanied by daylight raids from 12 January 1942. As the 25^th Army advanced towards Singapore island, the day and night raids increased in both frequency and intensity, resulting in thousands of civilian casualties.

During December, 51 Hawker Hurricane Mk II single-engined fighters were sent to Singapore, with 24 pilots, as core of five squadrons. They arrived on 3 January, by which stage the Buffalo squadrons had been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron RAF was formed and No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, a Buffalo squadron, had converted to the Hurricane; No. 232 Squadron became operational on 20 January and destroyed three Nakajima Ki-43 'Oscar' single-engined fighters on that day for the loss of three Hurricane fighters. Like the Buffalo, the Hurricane began to suffer severe losses in dogfights with the nimbler Japanese fighters. From 27 to 30 January, another 48 Hurricanes arrived on the fleet carrier Indomitable. Operated by the four squadrons of the RAF’s No. 226 Group, these flew from the P1 airfield near Palembang on the island of Sumatra in the Netherlands East Indies, while a flight was maintained in Singapore. Many of the Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground by air raids. The lack of an effective air early warning system throughout the campaign meant that many commonwealth aircraft were lost in this manner during Japanese attacks on airfields.

By the time of the Japanese landings on Singapore island, only 10 Hurricane fighters of No. 232 Squadron, based at RAF Kallang, remained to provide air cover for the British-led forces on Singapore. The airfields at Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery at Johore Bahru, and RAF Kallang had the only operational airstrip left. The surviving squadrons and aircraft had been withdrawn by January to reinforce the Dutch East Indies. On the morning of 9 February, dogfights took place over Sarimbun beach and other western areas. In the first encounter, the last 10 Hurricane fighters were scrambled from Kallang to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 aircraft, flying from Johore to provide air cover for the landing force: the Hurricane fighters shot down six Japanese aircraft and damaged 14 others for the loss of one of their own number.

Air combat continued for the rest of the day, and by the fall of night it had become clear that with the few aircraft still available, Kallang could no longer be used as a base and, with Percival’s agreement, the remaining flyable Hurricane fighters were withdrawn to Sumatra. A squadron of Hurricane fighters took to the skies on 9 February but was then withdrawn to the Netherlands East Indies and after that no commonwealth aircraft were again to be seen over Singapore and the Japanese had achieved total air supremacy.

During the evening of that day, three Fairmile B motor launches attacked and sank several Japanese landing craft in the Straits of Johore’s western channel. During the evening of 10 February, General Sir Archibald Wavell, commander-in-chief of the ABDACOM, ordered the transfer of all remaining commonwealth air force personnel to the Dutch East Indies.

Believing that further Japanese landings would occur in the north-east, Percival did not reinforce the Australian 22^nd Brigade until the morning of 9 February, when he ordered the despatch of two half-strength battalions of the Indian 12^th Brigade. The Indians reached Bennett at about 12.00, and shortly after this Percival allocated the composite Indian 6^th/15^th Brigade to reinforce the Australians from the brigade’s position around Singapore racecourse. Throughout the day, the Indian 44^th Brigade, still holding its position on the coast, began to feel pressure on its exposed flank and after discussions between Percival and Bennett, it was decided that the brigade would have to retire to the east in order to maintain the southern part of the commonwealth line. Bennett decided to form a secondary defensive line, known as the Kranji-Jurong Switch Line, facing to the west between the two rivers, with its centre around Bulim, to the east of Tengah airfield and just to the north of Jurong.

To the north, the Australian 27^th Brigade had not been engaged during the Japanese assaults on the first day. Now having only the 2/26^th and 2/30^th Battalions following the transfer of the 2/29^th Battalion to the Australian 22^nd Brigade, Maxwell sought to reorganise his brigade to deal with the threat posed to the western flank. Late on 9 February, the Imperial Guards Division, which had landed farther to the north on each side of the Kranji river, began to attack the positions of the Australian 27^th Brigade, concentrating on those held by the 2/26^th Battalion. During the initial assault, the Japanese suffered severe casualties from Australian mortars and machine guns, as well as from burning oil which had been sluiced into the water following the demolition of several oil tanks by the Australians. Some of the Guards reached the shore and maintained a tenuous beach-head. At the height of the initial assault, it is believed that Nishimura, the Imperial Guards Division's commander, requested permission to cancel the attack as a result of the high level of casualties his troops had suffered from the fire, but Yamashita ordered them to press on.

Communication problems were now causing further cracks in the commonwealth defence. Maxwell knew that the Australian 22^nd Brigade was under increasing pressure but was unable to contact Taylor and was wary of encirclement. As parties of Japanese infantrymen began to infiltrate the brigade’s positions from the west, exploiting the gap centred on the Kranji river, the 2/26^th Battalion was forced to withdraw to a position to the east of the Bukit Timah road; this move precipitated a sympathetic move by the 2/30^th Battalion away from the causeway. The authority for this withdrawal would later be the subject of debate, with Bennett stating that he had not given Maxwell authorisation to do so. The result was that the Allies lost control of the beaches adjoining the western side of the causeway, and exposed the high ground overlooking the causeway and the left flank of the Indian 11^th Division. The Japanese were thus given a firm foothold for the unopposed build up of their forces.

The opening at the Kranji river made it possible for the Imperial Guards Division's supporting armoured units to land there unopposed, after which the division was able to begin ferrying across its artillery and more armour. After finding his left flank exposed by the withdrawal of the Australian 27^th Brigade, the commander of the Indian 11^th Division, Key, despatched the Indian 8^th Brigade from reserve to retake the high ground to the south of the causeway. Throughout 10 February further fighting took place around along the Jurong Line, as orders were formulated for the creation of a secondary defensive line to the west of the Reformatory road using troops not then employed in the Jurong Line. However, a misinterpretation of these orders resulted in Taylor, the Australian 22^nd Brigade’s commander , prematurely withdrawing his troops to the east, where they were joined by anad hoc unit of only 200 Australian reinforcements known as X Battalion. The Jurong Line eventually collapsed after the Indian 12^th Brigade was withdrawn by its commander, Brigadier A. Paris, to the road junction near Bukit Panjang after he lost contact with the Australian 27^th Brigade on his right. Ballantine, the commander of the Indian 44^th Brigade, commanding the extreme left of the line, also misinterpreted the orders in the same manner that Taylor had, and withdrew.

In the early afternoon of 10 February, on learning of the collapse of the Jurong Line, Wavell ordered Percival to launch a counterattack to retake it. The order was forwarded to Bennett, who allocated X Battalion to the task. Percival made plans of his own for the counterattack, detailing a three-phase operation that involved the majority of the Australian 22^nd Brigade, and subsequently passed this to Bennett, who began implementing the plan but forgot to call back the X Battalion. The battalion, comprising poorly trained and equipped replacements, advanced to an assembly area near Bukit Timah. In the early hours of 11 February, the Japanese, who had concentrated significant forces around Tengah airfield and on the Jurong road, began further offensive operations: the 5^th Division aimed its advance toward Bukit Panjang, while the 18^th Division struck toward Bukit Timah. The Japanese fell on the X Battalion, which had camped in its assembly area before launching its counterattack, and two-thirds of the battalion were killed or wounded. After brushing aside elements of the Indian 6^th/15^th Brigade, the Japanese again began attacking the Australian 22^nd Brigade around the Reformatory road.

Later on 11 February, with Japanese supplies running low, Yamashita attempted to bluff Percival, calling on him to 'give up this meaningless and desperate resistance'. The fighting strength of the Australian 22^nd Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the Japanese attacks, had by this time been reduced to a few hundred men, and the Japanese had captured the Bukit Timah area, including the main food and fuel depots of the garrison. Wavell told Percival that the garrison was to fight to the end and that there should be no general surrender in Singapore. With the vital water supply of the reservoirs in the centre of the island threatened, the Australian 27^th Brigade was later ordered to recapture Bukit Panjang as a preliminary to the recapture of Bukit Timah. The counterattack was repulsed by the Imperial Guards Division, however, and the Australian 27^th Brigade was split into halves on each side of the Bukit Timah road with elements spread as far as the Pierce Reservoir.

On the following day, as their situation continued to worsen, the commonwealth forces sought to consolidate their defences. During the night of 12/13 February, the order was given for a 28-mile (45-km) perimeter to be established around Singapore city at the south-eastern end of the island. This was achieved by moving the defending forces from the beaches along the north-western shore and from area round Changi on the eastern tip of the island, with the 18^th Division tasked to maintain control of the vital reservoirs and creating a link with the forces of Simmons’s Southern Area. The withdrawing troops received harassing attacks all the their way back. Elsewhere, the Australian 22^nd Brigade continued to hold a position to the west of the Holland road until late in the evening when, it was pulled back to Holland village.

On 13 February, Japanese engineers repaired the road over the causeway and this made it possible for more tanks to by pushed across to the island. With the commonwealth still losing ground, senior officers advised Percival to surrender in the interest of minimising civilian casualties. Percival refused, but tried to get authority from Wavell for greater discretion as to when resistance might be brought to an end. The Japanese captured the water reservoirs which supplied the city, but did not cut off the supply. On that same day, military police executed Captain Patrick Heenan for espionage: an Indian army air liaison officer, Heenan had been recruited by Japanese military intelligence and had used a radio to assist the Japanese in their attacks on commonwealth airfields in northern Malaya; he had been arrested on 10 December and court-martialled in January, and was shot at Keppel Harbour, on the southern side of Singapore and his body was thrown into the sea.

The Australians occupied a perimeter of their own to the north-west around Tanglin Barracks, in which they maintained an all-round defence as a precaution. To their right, British 18^th Division, the Indian 11^th Division and Brigadier F. N. Fraser’s 2^nd Malaya Brigade held the perimeter from the edge of the Farrar road eastward to Kallang, while to their left, the Indian 44^th Brigade and the 1^st Malaya Brigade held the perimeter from Buona Vista to Pasir Panjang. For the most part, there was only limited fighting around the perimeter except around Pasir Panjang ridge, 1 mile (1.6 km) from Singapore Harbour, where the 1^st Malaya Brigade, which comprised one Malayan infantry battalion, two British infantry battalions and a force of Royal Engineers, fought a stubborn defensive action during the 'Battle of Pasir Panjang'. The Japanese largely avoided attacking the Australian perimeter, but in the northern area, Brigadier C. L. B. Duke’s British 53^rd Brigade was pushed back by a Japanese assault up the Thompson road and had to fall back to the north of Braddell road in the evening, joining the rest of the British 18^th Division in the line. These forces dug in and throughout the night fierce fighting raged on the northern front.

On the following day, the remaining commonwealth units continued to fight Civilian casualties mounted as a million people crowded into the 3-mile (4.8-m) area still held by the commonwealth forces, and bombing and artillery-fire increased. The civilian authorities began to fear that the water supply would give out, and Percival was advised that large quantities of water were being lost from damaged pipes and that the water supply was on the verge of collapse.

On 14 February, the Japanese renewed their assault on the western part of the Southern Area’s defences near the area which the 1^st Malayan Brigade had fought desperately to hold during the previous day. At about 13.00 the Japanese broke through and advanced toward the Alexandra Barracks Hospital. A British lieutenant, acting as an envoy under a white flag, approached the Japanese forces but was killed with a bayonet. Once they had entered the hospital, Japanese soldiers killed up to 50 soldiers, including some undergoing surgery. Doctors and nurses were also killed. On the following day, about 200 male staff members and patients who had been assembled and bound the previous day, many of them walking wounded, were ordered to walk about 440 yards (400 m) to an industrial area. Those who fell on the way were bayoneted. The men were forced into a series of small, badly ventilated rooms in which they were held overnight without water. Some died during the night as a result of their treatment. The remainder were bayoneted the following morning. Several survivors were identified after the war, of whom some had survived by pretending to be dead.

Throughout the night of 14/15 February, the Japanese continued to exert pressure on the commonwealth perimeter, and though the line largely held, the military supply situation was worsening rapidly. The water system was badly damaged and supply was uncertain, rations were running low, petrol for military vehicles was all but exhausted, and there was little ammunition left for the field artillery and anti-aircraft guns, which were unable to disrupt the Japanese air attacks causing many casualties in the city centre. Little work had been done to build air raid shelters, and looting and desertion by commonwealth troops exacerbated the chaos in the area. At 09.30 Percival held a conference at Fort Canning with his senior commanders and proposed two options: an immediate counterattack to regain the reservoirs and the military food depots around Bukit Timah, or surrender. All present agreed that a counterattack was impossible, and Percival therefore opted for surrender. Post-war analysis has shown that a counterattack might have succeeded, for the Japanese were at the limit of their supply line and their artillery units were also running out of ammunition.

A delegation was selected to go to the Japanese headquarters. It consisted of a senior staff officer, the colonial secretary and an interpreter. The three set off in a car, flying a Union flag and a white flag of truce, toward the Japanese lines to discuss a ceasefire. The three delegates returned with orders that Percival himself proceed with staff officers to the Ford motor factory, where Yamashita would lay down the terms of surrender. Another requirement was that the Japanese flag be hoisted over the Cathay Building, Singapore’s tallest building. Percival formally surrendered shortly after 17.15. Earlier in that day, Percival had issued orders to destroy all secret and technical equipment, ciphers, codes, secret documents and heavy guns.

Under the surrender terms, hostilities were to cease at 20.30 that evening, all the military forces in Singapore were to surrender unconditionally, all commonwealth forces were to remain in position and disarm themselves within an hour, and the British were allowed to maintain a force of 1,000 armed men to prevent looting until relieved by the Japanese. Yamashita also accepted full responsibility for the lives of the civilians in the city. Following the surrender, Bennett caused controversy when he decided to escape: he handed command of the Australian 8^th Division to the divisional artillery commander, Brigadier C. Callaghan, and with some of his staff officers commandeered a small boat. In this the Australian party eventually reached Australia while between 15,000 and 20,000 Australian soldiers were reportedly captured. Bennett blamed Percival and the Indian troops for the defeat, but Callaghan reluctantly stated that Australian units had been affected by the desertion of many men toward the end of the battle.

In analysing the campaign, a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, blamed Maxwell, commander of the Australian 27^th Brigade, for his defeatist attitude and not properly defending the sector between the causeway and the Kranji river, and also claimed that Australians made up the majority of stragglers. Another commentator claimed that Taylor had cracked under the pressure. It has also been argued that the Australian 22^nd Brigade was so heavily outnumbered that defeat was inevitable, and that Percival’s insistence on concentrating the Australian 22^nd Brigade on the water’s edge had been a serious mistake.

Although they comprised 13% of the British-led ground forces, the Australians suffered 73% of the battle deaths. It has also been argued, with considerable justification, that the reason for the fall of Singapore was the complete failure of the Singapore strategy, to which Australian policy-makers had contributed in their acquiescence and the lack of military resources allocated to the fighting in Malaya.

The Japanese had advanced some 650 miles (1045 km) from Singora on the ThaiMalay border, to the southern coast of Singapore at an average rate of 9 miles (14 km) per day. While impressed with Japan’s quick succession of victories, Adolf Hitler reportedly had mixed views regarding Singapore’s fall, seeing it as a setback for the 'white race' but ultimately something that was in Germany’s military interests. Hitler reportedly forbade the German foreign minister, Joachim Ribbentrop, from issuing a congratulatory communiqué. Churchill called the fall of Singapore to the Japanese 'the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history'.

Nearly 85,000 British, Indian, Australian and other commonwealth troops were taken prisoner, in addition to losses during the earlier fighting in Malaya. About 5,000 men, most of them Australian, had been killed or wounded. Japanese casualties during the fighting for Singapore island amounted to 1,714 men killed and 3,378 wounded. During the 70-day campaign in Malaya and Singapore, the overall total of commonwealth casualties was some 8,708 men killed or wounded and 130,000 men taken prisoner (38,496 British, 18,490 Australian of whom 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, 67,340 Indian, and 14,382 local volunteer troops) against 9,824 Japanese casualties.

The Japanese occupation of Singapore started with the British surrender. Japanese newspapers triumphantly declared the victory as deciding the general situation of the war. The city was renamed Syonan-to (Southern Island gained in the age of Showa, or Light of the South). The Japanese sought vengeance against the Chinese and anyone who held anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese authorities were suspicious of the Chinese because of the 2^nd Sino-Japanese War, and murdered thousands of citizen 'undesirables' (mostly ethnic Chinese) in the Sook Ching massacre. The other ethnic groups of Singapore, such as the Malays and Indians, were not spared. Residents suffered great hardships under Japanese rule over the following years. Many British and Australian soldiers taken prisoner remained in Singapore’s Changi Prison, in which many died. Thousands of others were transported to other parts of Asia, including Japan, to be used as forced labour on projects such as the Thai/Burmese 'death railway' and Sandakan airfield in North Borneo. Many of those aboard died when the ships in which they were transported were sunk.

An Indian revolutionary, Subhas Chandra Bose, formed the pro-independence Indian National Army with the help of the Japanese, and this was very successful in recruiting Indian prisoners of war: in February 1942, out of approximately 40,000 Indian personnel in Singapore, about 30,000 joined the Indian National Army, of which about 7,000 fought commonwealth forces in the Burma campaign and in the north-east Indian regions of Kohima and Imphal; others became prisoner of war camp guards at Changi. An unknown number was taken to Japanese-occupied areas in the South Pacific as forced labour, as which many suffered severe hardships and brutality similar to that experienced by other prisoners held by Japan during the war. About 6,000 survived until they could be liberated by Australian and US forces in 1943/1945.

Commando raids were carried out against Japanese shipping in Singapore harbour in 'Jaywick' and 'Rimau' during 1943 and 1944 respectively, and gained varying degrees of success. The UK had planned to retake Singapore in 'Mailfist' during 1945, but the war ended before this undertaking could be carried out. The island was reoccupied in 'Tiderace' by British, Indian and Australian forces after the surrender of Japan in September 1945. Yamashita was tried by a US military commission for war crimes (but not for crimes committed by his troops in Malaya and Singapore), convicted and hanged in the Philippine islands group on 23 February 1946.