The 'Campaign for the Huon Peninsula' was a series of battles fought between Allied and Japanese forces in north-eastern New Guinea for the Huon peninsula (22 September 1943/1 March 1944).

The campaign formed the initial part of an offensive which the Allies launched in the Pacific theatre late in 1943 and resulted in the Japanese being pushed north from Lae to Sio on the northern coast of New Guinea over the course of a four-month period. For the Australians, a significant advantage was gained through the technological edge that Allied industry had achieved over the Japanese by this phase of the war, while the Japanese were hampered by a lack of supplies and reinforcements as a result of the Allied interdiction efforts at sea and in the air.

The campaign was preceded by an amphibious landing by troops of Major General G. F. Wootten’s Australian 9^th Division on the coast to the east of Lae on 4 September 1943. This was followed by an advance to the west along the coast toward the town of Lae, where they were to link with elements of Major General G. A. Vasey’s Australian 7^th Division advancing from Nadzab. Meanwhile, Australian and US forces mounted diversionary attacks around Salamaua. Heavy rain and flooding slowed the advance of the Australian 9^th Division, which had to cross several rivers, and the Japanese rearguard also put up a stiff defence: as a result, Lae did not fall until 16 September, when troops of the Australian 7^th Division entered the town ahead of those of the Australian 9^th Division, and the main body of the Japanese force escaped to the north into the Huon peninsula. Less than a week later, the Huon peninsula campaign began as the Australians undertook another amphibious landing farther to the east, this 'Diminish' being aimed at the capture of Finschhafen.

Following 'Diminish', the Allies set about an advance to the south in order to secure Finschhafen, which also resulted in fighting around Jivevaneng. In the middle of October, the Japanese launched a counterattack against the Australian 'Diminish' beach-head, and this lasted for about a week and resulted in a small contraction of the Australian lines and a splitting of their force before the Japanese assault had been defeated. After this, the Australians regained the initiative and began to pursue the Japanese, who withdrew inland toward the high ground around Sattelberg. In the course of heavy fighting and a second failed Japanese counterattack, Sattelberg was secured late in November and the Australians began an area advance to the north to secure a line between Wareo and Gusika. This had been completed by a time early in December, and was followed by an Australian advance along the coast through Lakona to Fortification Point, overcoming strong Japanese forces fighting delaying actions.

The final stage of the campaign saw the Japanese resistance finally break. A swift advance by the Australians along the Huon peninsula’s northern coast followed, and in January 1944 the Australians captured Sio. At the same time, US forces landed at Saidor in 'Dexterity'. After this, mopping-up operations were undertaken by the Allied forces around Sio until March, and Madang was captured in April. A period of relative inactivity then followed in northern New Guinea until July, when US forces clashed with the Japanese around the Driniumor river. This was followed by further fighting in November 1944 when the Australians opened a fresh campaign in the area of Aitape and Wewak.

The Huon peninsula is situated on the north-eastern coast of New Guinea, and extends from Lae in the south on the Huon Gulf to Sio in the north along the Vitiaz Strait. Along the coast between these two points, numerous rivers and streams cut the terrain, and of these the most prominent are the Song, Bumi and Mape rivers. These flow from the mountainous interior, which is formed through the conglomeration of the Rawlinson mountain range in the south with the Cromwell mountain range in the east. These meet in the centre of the peninsula to form the Saruwaged massif, which joins the Finisterre mountain range farther to the west. Apart from a thin, flat coastal strip, at the time of the 'Campaign for the Huon Peninsula' the area was thickly covered with dense jungle, through which very few tracks had been cut. The terrain is rugged and for the most part the tracks, until improved by engineers, were largely impassable to motor transport and as a result throughout the campaign a large amount of the Allied resupply effort was undertaken on foot.

During the planning stage of their offensive, the Allies identified three areas as key and decisive terrain in the region: the beach to the north of Katika, which was later codenamed 'Scarlet' by the Allies; the 3,150-ft (960-m) peak called Sattelberg some 5 miles (8 km) to the south-west, which dominated the area as a result of its height; and Finschhafen, which possessed a small airfield and was sited on the coast in a bay which offered a protected harbour 5.6 miles (9 km) to the south of the 'Scarlet' beach. The Japanese also regarded Sattelberg and Finschhafen as key areas and, in addition to these, identified a ridge running between the village of Gusika on the coast, about 3.4 miles (5.5 km) to the north of Katika, and Wareo 4.7 miles (7.5 km) inland to the west. The importance of this ridge lay in the track that ran along it, over which the Japanese supplied their forces around Sattelberg. It also offered a natural barrier to any advance to the north from Finschhafen, making it a potential defensive line.

By 1943, Japanese expansion in the South-West Pacific Area had come to an end. The Japanese advance in Papua New Guinea had been halted the previous year by the blocking action that Australian forces had fought along the Kokoda Track. Subsequent defeats at Milne Bay, Buna/Gona and Wau, and on Guadalcanal island, had forced the Japanese to begin planning for a defensive rather than offensive/defensive war in this theatre. As a result of these victories, the Allies were thus able to seize the initiative in the region from the middle of 1943 and began making plans to continue pushing back the Japanese in New Guinea.

Allied planners began formulating their plans for the future direction of the fighting in the wider Pacific with a focus upon retaking the Philippine islands groups and the eventual capture of the Japanese home islands. The linchpin to Japanese strength in the region was their main base at Rabaul toward the north-eastern tip of New Britain island. The reduction of this base came to be seen as a key tenet of success in the South-West Pacific Area for the Allies, who formalised the concept as 'Cartwheel'.

In order to achieve this, the Allies needed access to a number of air bases in the region. The Allies most senior commanders, including General Douglas MacArthur, directed that two air bases be secured: one at Lae and the other at Finschhafen. The capture of Lae would provide the Allies with a port to supply Nadzab and would facilitate operations in the Markham river valley. Gaining control of Finschhafen, and thus the wider Huon peninsula, was an important precursor to the conduct operations on New Britain island by providing a natural harbour, and enabling control of the strategically important Vitiaz and Dampier Straits.

At this time, there were no US ground forces under MacArthur’s command in action against the Japanese, and the task of securing Finschhafen was allocated to the Australian 9^th Division. A veteran formation of the all-volunteer 2^nd Australian Imperial Force, the 9^th Division was highly experienced, having fought in the North African campaign, where it had held Tobruk against a German onslaught earlier in the war and had been heavily engaged at the '1^st Battle of El Alamein' and '2^nd Battle of El Alamein'. Early in 1943, the division had been brought back to Australia, and had subsequently been reorganised and retrained for jungle warfare. With an establishment of 13,118 men, the division consisted of three brigades of infantry (the 20^th, 24^th and 26^th Brigades), each comprising three infantry battalions, along with organic battalion-level engineer, pioneer artillery and armoured units attached at divisional level. In support of the 9^th Division, militia infantry units of from the Australian 4^th Brigade would also take part in the fighting after the initial fighting. US forces would also be involved, mainly in the provision of logistical, naval and engineering support services.

Air support was provided by the Royal Australian Air Force’s No. 9 Operational Group, which included several squadrons such as No. 4 Squadron flying Commonwealth Boomerang single-engined fighter-bombers and Commonwealth Wirraway single-engined close support aircraft, and No. 24 Squadron equipped with Vultee Vengeance single-engined dive-bombers. These units undertook numerous close air support and resupply missions throughout the campaign. The US Army Air Forces provided Republic P-47 Thunderbolt single-engined fighter-bombers and Lockheed P-38 Lightning twin-engine fighter-bombers of the 348^th and 475^th Fighter Groups, which were also used to provide fighter cover for Allied shipping, while heavy and medium bombers of the US 5^th Army Air Force carried out strategic bombing missions to reduce the Japanese air bases around Wewak and on New Britain, and raided Japanese lines of communication in concert with PT-boats. Given the complete impracticality of of using wheeled transport in the jungle, Allied logistics was undertaken primarily by means of water transport such as landing craft and barges, which moved supplies along the coast, with overland supply to combat units completed by New Guinean porters and, at times, by Australian combat troops themselves after being re-roled on a temporary basis to undertake portage tasks but augmented where possible with Jeeps.

The main Japanese force in the campaign was the 18^th Army under the command of Lieutenant General Hatazo Adachi, who had his headquarters in Madang. This army comprised three major formations (the 20^th Division, the 41^st Division and the 51^st Division) and a number of smaller units which included naval infantry and garrison units. Around the Finschhafen area in the middle of September 1943, the main forces were drawn from Lieutenant General Shigeru Katagiri’s 20^th Division (80^th Regiment and 26^th Field Artillery Regiment), Lieutenant General Heisuke Abe’s 41^st Division (238^th Regiment), the naval 85^th Garrison Unit and Lieutenant General Hidemitsu Nakano’s 51^st Division (one company of the 102^nd Regiment). These forces were commanded locally by Major General Eizo Yamada, commander of the 1^st Shipping Group, although tactical command was devolved to local level as a result of the geographical spread of the Japanese units. These units were situated across a broad area between the Mongi river, east of Lae to Arndt Point, Sattelberg, Joangeng, Logaweng, Finschhafen and Sisi, and on Tami island. The largest concentrations were around Sattelberg and Finschhafen, where the main forces came under Katagiri’s command. The strength and efficiency of the Japanese units had been considerably reduced by disease, and by their employment in road construction tasks between Madang and Bogadjim.

Like the Allies, the Japanese also relied on water transport to ferry supplies and reinforcements around the coasts of New Guinea, using a force of three submarines to avoid interdiction by Allied aircraft which had previously inflicted heavy casualties during the 'Battle of the Bismarck Sea'. These submarines were augmented by barges, although they were limited in supply and were subject to attack by Allied aircraft and PT-boats. Once the supplies had been landed, resupply parties were used to carry the stores overland on foot along a number of key tracks to the Japanese main troop concentrations around Sattelberg and Finschhafen. Air support was provided by Lieutenant General Kunachi Teramoto’s 4^th Air Army, comprising primarily Lieutenant General Einosuke Sudo’s 7^th Air Division and the 14^th Air Brigade, along with some elements from Lieutenant General Giichi Itahana’s 6^th Air Division. Based around Wewak, the Japanese aircraft were flown mainly to escort Japanese shipping and attack Allied shipping around the main beach-head during the campaign, with a secondary task of undertaking ground-attack missions in support of Japanese troops. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka’s 11^th Air Fleet, based at Rabaul, also undertook anti-ship missions. Despite the availability of these units to the Japanese, heavy Allied bombing of Japanese airfields around Wewak in August 1943 greatly reduced the number of aircraft available to the Japanese and limited their ability to apply airpower throughout the campaign.

The Japanese force lacked transport, engineer and logistical support and was hampered by the lack of cohesion resulting from its disparate command structure and poor infrastructure. In contrast, the Australian force had fought together in previous campaigns and was backed by a formidable logistical support base that could deliver the benefits of a technological and industrial superiority that the Japanese were unable to match.

Following MacArthur’s directive to secure the airfields at Lae and Finschhafen, the commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces, South West Pacific Area, the Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey, ordered the seizure of the Huon peninsula by Wootten’s Australian 9^th Division, starting with the capture of Lae. The Allied plan formulated to achieve this was based on an amphibious landing by the the 9^th Division to the east of Lae while the Australian 7^th Division was delivered by air to Nadzab in the Markham river valley, which had been secured by airborne troops of the US 503^rd Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 2/4^th Field Regiment. From Nadzab, the Australian 7^th Division was to advance on Lae from the south to support the Australian 9^th Division’s drive on the same objective from the east. At the same time, Major General S. G. Savige’s Australian 3^rd Division and the US 162^nd Infantry were to fight a diversionary action around Salamaua.

After training in Queensland and at Milne Bay at the south-eastern tip of Papua, the Australian 9^th Division embarked in US ships of Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey’s VII Amphibious Force as part of what was the largest amphibious operation yet undertaken by Allied forces in the South-West Pacific up to that time. Brigadier Victor The 20^th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier W. J. V. Windeyer’s Australian 20^th Brigade was selected to spearhead the assault on a beach 16 miles (26 km) to the east of Lae. In preparation, early on 4 September five destroyers fired a heavy six-minute bombardment, and immediately after this bombardment’s end the 2/13^th Battalion led the Australian 20^th Brigade ashore, with the brigade’s other two units, the 2/15^th and 2/17^th Battalions, coming ashore shortly afterward in the second and third waves. Unopposed on the ground, the Australian infantry quickly began to move inland as further reinforcements arrived. About 35 minutes after the initial landing, as the Australian divisional headquarters and the 2/23^rd Battalion were coming ashore, a small force of Japanese aircraft attacked the landing craft carrying the infantry ashore. As a result, two of these craft were heavily damaged and numerous casualties inflicted, including the 2/23^rd's commanding officer, who was killed when a Japanese bomb landed on the bridge of LCI-339.

More Japanese air attacks came in the afternoon. A force of about 70 Japanese aircraft, operating from bases on New Britain island, were beaten off over Finschhafen. Another group achieved success around Morobe, however, attacking empty transport vessels which were departing Finschhafen, while off Cape Ward Hunt another group attacked an Allied convoy carrying follow-on forces, including the rest of Brigadier D. A. Whitehead’s Australian 26^th Brigade. On board LST-471, 43 men were killed and another 30 wounded, while eight were killed and 37 wounded on LST-473. This did not prevent the flow of supplies and the arrival of additional reinforcements in the form of Brigadier B. Evans’s Australian 24^th Brigade on the following day. The Australians then began the arduous advance to the west in the direction of Lae, passing through 'thick jungle, swamps, kunai grass and numerous rain-swollen rivers and streams' which, along with heavy rain, slowed their progress. On the night of 5/6 September, the Japanese launched an attack on the leading Australian battalion, but were unable to prevent its advance. At this point, the Australian 26^th Brigade moved inland to strike toward Lae from the north-east while the Australian 24^th Brigade continued the advance along the coast.

It was at this point that the Australian 9^th Division’s advance began to suffer from a lack of supplies which, along with the rugged terrain, slowed progress, and it was therefore 9 September before the division reached the Busu river. The 2/28^th Battalion was leading the Australian advance at this stage and the soldiers waded across. The current was strong and many of the men were swept away, 13 of them being drowned. Nevertheless, the 2/28^th Battalion was able to establish a bridgehead to the west of the river. At this point, with a resumption of the heavy rain the river rose once more, preventing any other units from crossing. This effectively isolated the single Australian battalion, which was then subjected to repeated attacks by the Japanese. On 14 September, the Australian 26^th Brigade was able to force its way across and the advance continued. Along the coast the Australian 24^th Brigade was held up by a determined Japanese defence in front of the Butibum river, which was the final water crossing before Lae. The stream was finally forded on 16 September, by which time Lae had fallen to troops from the Australian 7^th Division.

In the fighting for Lae more than 2,200 Japanese soldiers were killed while, in contrast, the Australian casualties were considerably lighter, with the Australian 9^th Division losing 77 men killed and 73 missing. Despite the Allied success in capturing Lae, the Japanese had achieved a creditable defence, which had not only slowed the Allied advance, but had also allowed the bulk of the Japanese forces in the vicinity to get away, withdrawing to the north into the Huon peninsula, where they could continue the fight.

Lae had fallen sooner than had been anticipated, and the Allies were quick to exploit the advantage. The first phase of the new campaign consisted of an amphibious landing by Allied troops north of Siki Cove near the confluence of the Siki river and south of the Song river on 'Scarlet' beach. Positioned farther to the east on the peninsula from Lae, in terms of strategic importance Finschhafen overshadowed Lae in the minds of the Allied planners for its potential to support operations across the Vitiaz Strait into New Britain. As a result of faulty intelligence, which underestimated the size of the Japanese force in the area, the assault force chosen by the Allied commanders consisted of just the Australian 20^th Brigade. Meanwhile, the Australian 7^th Division was to move to the north-west from Lae in a separate campaign, advancing through the Markham and Ramu river valleys toward the Finisterre mountain range.

After a short period of preparation, the Australian 20^th Brigade’s landing took place on 22 September. Navigational errors resulted in the troops being landed on the wrong beaches, some of them coming ashore at Siki Cove and taking heavy fire from the strong Japanese defences in pillboxes and behind obstacles. After reorganising on the beach, the Australians pushed inland. The Japanese put up stiff resistance around the high ground at Katika, but were eventually forced back. By the end of the day, having suffered 94 casualties, the Australians had secured a useful beach-head. Late in the day, a force of around 30 Japanese bombers, escorted by as many as 40 fighters, from the Wewak-based 4^th Air Army was despatched to attack Allied shipping around Finschhafen. Forewarned by the US destroyer Reid, which was serving as an air picket and fighter controller in the Vitiaz Strait, the Allies were able to concentrate five squadrons of US fighter aircraft over the convoy, and in the resulting air battle 39 Japanese aircraft were shot down and the raid was turned back.

On the next day the Australians began their advance toward the village of Finschhafen, about 5.6 miles (9 km) to the south of the landing beach, with the 2/15^th Battalion leading the way to the Bumi river. The Japanese had established strong defences along this river’s southern bank, which the Australians attempted to outflank by sending a force to the west, climbing through steep terrain. Once they had located a suitable place to cross the river, the Australians began wading across but were taken under fire by a group of Japanese naval infantry positioned on a high feature overlooking the river. Despite taking casualties, the Australians were able to establish themselves south of the Bumi river and at that point the 2/13^th Battalion began to advance on Finschhafen from the west. Meanwhile, the 2/15^th Battalion attacked the left flank of the Japanese who had opposed their crossing. After advancing up the steep slope under fire, sometimes on their hands and knees, the 2/15^th Battalion took the position at bayonet point, killing 52 Japanese in close combat.

The continued Australian advance to the south spread them thin on the ground. As a result of concerns that the western flank was exposed, the 2/17^th Battalion was sent along the Sattelberg track to deflect any Japanese thrusts from that point. At Jivevaneng, the battalion was stopped and there the Japanese 80^th Regiment launched a series of determined attacks at it tried to break through to the coast.

At this point, Australian fears of a Japanese counterattack grew and the Australian command requested reinforcements from MacArthur, who denied the request as his intelligence staff believed that there were only 350 Japanese in the vicinity. Actually, there were already 5,000 Japanese around Sattelberg and Finschhafen, and in the early part of October this number grew to 12,000 as the Japanese began to prepare their counterattack. The Australians did receive a limited reinforcement in the form of the 2/43^rd Battalion, whose arrival meant that the 2/17^th Battalion, deadlocked around Jivevaneng, could be freed for the advance on Finschhafen, thus enabling the whole of the Australian 20^th Brigade to be concentrated on that objective.

After an attack across the Ilebbe Creek by the 2/13^th Battalion, which cost the Australians 80 casualties on 1 October, the Japanese naval troops holding Finschhafen began to withdraw, and on October, the town fell to the Australians and the Japanese abandoned the Kakakog Ridge amid heavy Australian air and artillery attacks. Once the Australian 20^th Brigade was established in Finschhafen, it linked with the 22^nd Battalion, a militia unit. This had cleared the coastal area in the south of the peninsula, advancing from Lae over the mountains. Meanwhile, the Japanese that had been around Finschhafen withdrew into the mountains around Sattelberg. Allied air operations from Finschhafen airfield began on 4 October, on the following day the 2/17^th Battalion was sent to Kumawa to follow the retreating Japanese forces, and for the next couple of days minor clashes resulted before the battalion established itself at Jivevaneng again on 7 October.

The Japanese had begun planning a counterattack during the Australian advance on Finschhafen. The main part of the 20^th Division was moved down from Madang as the Japanese began concentrating their forces around Sattelberg, where the main force arrived on 11 October. The Japanese plans became known to the Australians through captured documents, and by the middle of October 1943 Brigadier S. H. W. C. Porter’s Australian 24^th Brigade had been brought up to reinforce the Australian 20^th Brigade. When the Japanese counterattack came, signalled by a bonfire on Sattelberg, its first wave fell on the Australian 24^th Brigade around Jivevaneng on 16 October but, committed in a piecemeal fashion, the attack was pushed back. On the next day Japanese aircraft attacked Allied forces around 'Scarlet' beach, and this was followed soon afterward by an amphibious landing which was all but destroyed at sea by fire from US and Australian anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. Only a small number of Japanese managed to make it ashore through the devastating fire and, by the following day, these men all had been killed or wounded by Australian infantry conducting mopping-up operations.

The main elements of the Japanese counterattack had penetrated the forward and thinly stretched Australian lines throughout the previous night. The Japanese exploited the gaps in the line between the 2/28^th Battalion and the 2/3^rd Pioneer Battalion, and launched an attack towards the coast with the objective of capturing the high ground 1.7 miles (2.7 km) to the west of 'Scarlet' Beach, and splitting the Australian forces at Katika.

The Australian 24^th Brigade withdrew from Katika and the high ground to the north of 'Scarlet' beach to strengthen the defences around the beach-head in response to the Japanese penetration, while the Australian 20^th Brigade was moved into position along the Siki Creek to block the Japanese advancing toward Finschhafen. The Australian resistance was strong despite the fact that it had given up the advantage of the high ground, with field and anti-aircraft artillery engaging at ranges as short as 220 yards (200 m) over open sights. As result, the Japanese attack was turned away from 'Scarlet' beach and channelled down Siki Creek. Nevertheless, the Japanese succeeded in breaking through to Siki Cove by 18 October and effectively drove a wedge between the Australian 24^th Brigade in the north and the Austtalian 20^th Brigade in the south. In doing so, the Japanese captured a considerable quantity of Allied supplies, including ammunition, weapons and rations, helping to replenish their own dwindling supplies.

During the night of 18/19 October, the Japanese cut the route that the Australians were using to supply the 2/17^th Battalion defending Jivevaneng, and established a roadblock astride the road linking Jivevaneng and Sattelberg. The 2/17^th Battalion and a number of other Australian units, such as most of the 2/3^rd Pioneer Battalion and part of the 2/28^th Battalion, became isolated behind Japanese lines. In order to keep them supplied, emergency air drops of ammunition were made by aircraft of No. 4 Squadron.

At this point, the Japanese attack began to slow. The strength of the Australian resistance had inflicted in heavy casualties and as a result the Japanese were unable to take advantage of the gains they had made. This allowed the Australians to begin their own counterthrust on 19 October. Following a heavy artillery preparation, the 2/28^th Battalion retook Katika. The Australians received reinforcements on the next day when a squadron of the 1^st Tank Battalion’s Matilda infantry tanks arrived by landing craft at Langemak Bay amid tight security aimed at keeping the armoured vehicles' arrival secret from the Japanese. Accompanying the tanks was Brigadier D. A. Whitehead’s Australian 26^th Brigade, whose arrival meant that the 9^th Division had now been committed in its entirety. Although on 21 October the Japanese withdrew from Siki Cove, the fighting around Katika continued for four more days as the Japanese attempted to retake it against fierce resistance from the 2/28^th Battalion. Katagiri gave the order for his forces to withdraw back to Sattelberg by 25 October after it had become clear that the counterattack had been defeated. The Japanese had suffered 1,500 casualties, including 679 killed. In comparison, the Australians had lost 49 men killed and 179 wounded.

Sattelberg lies some 5 miles (8 km) inland and as a result of its its size and its height of 3,150 ft (960 m), its possession by a large force of Japanese posed a significant threat in the minds of the Australian commanders. It offered good observation of the coastal area and could serve as a base for the Japanese to disrupt Australian lines of communication. As a result, Wootten decided to capture it. The main approach to the mission lay along the road running through Jivevaneng. Although the main thrust of the Japanese counterattack had been turned back by 25 October, Jivevaneng was still in doubt and the 2/17^th Battalion was still fending off Japanese attacks. Consequently, the 2/13^th Battalion was brought up and with the 2/17^th Battalion began clearing operations. These had been completed by the night of 2/3 November, when the Japanese ceased their assault and withdrew from around the village. Follow-up actions on 6 November resulted in the destruction of the roadblock which the Japanese had established during October on the Sattelberg road to the east of Jivevaneng.

With the issue at Jivevaneng decided, the Australians began to advance westward in the direction of Sattelberg. The force that was chosen for this was the recently arrived Australian 26^th Brigade, which would be supported by nine Matilda tanks. At the same time, the Australian 4^th Brigade, a militia unit detached from the Australian 5^th Division, was brought up to relieve the Australian 26^th Brigade of garrison duties around Finschhafen. The tanks moved up to Jivevaneng under the cover of an artillery barrage designed to drown the sound of their engines and thus keep their presence secret until the start of the advance. On 16 November, the 2/48^th Battalion, supported by the artillery of the 2/12^th Field Regiment and the machine guns of the 2/2^nd Machine Gun Battalion, captured Green Ridge overlooking the track, which was the designated forming-up point for the advance that began on the following day.[69]

The advance got off to a bad start as it was hampered in the inland area by the prevalent rugged terrain, which consisted largely of thick jungle and steep razorback ridges. The ability of forces to manoeuvre in this environment was limited and Whitehead therefore opted to use infiltration. He sent columns of infantry, each of no more than one company, to advance along narrow fronts ahead of one or two tanks, with engineers in support to improve the track or deal with any booby traps or mines that were discovered. The brigade’s scheme of manoeuvre saw the 2/48^th Battalion advance up the main track as the 2/23^rd Battalion and 2/24^th Battalion protected its flanks to the south and north respectively. The Australians took none of their first-day objectives. The 2/48^th Battalion was held up in front of Coconut Ridge by stubborn resistance after one of the tanks had been disabled and two others damaged. On the flanks, both the 2/23^rd and 2/24^th Battalions also came up against strong defences in the shape of pillboxes and machine gun nests, suffering many casualties, and Coconut Ridge did not fall until the following day.

The advance then continued, and by 20 November Steeple Tree Hill had been secured by the 2/48^th Battalion, with the 2/23^rd Battalion advancing toward its southern portion from Kumawa and the 2/24^th Battalion continuing to attack to the north toward the '2200' feature. Initially, this had just been conceived as a holding action to protect the 2/48^th Battalion’s flank, but as a result of the slow progress on the main track, at this point Whitehead decided on a change, determining to use a double-pronged attack with the 2/24^th Battalion also attempting to break through to Sattelberg from the north.

Elsewhere, in the north-east, closer to the coast, the establishment of observation posts on key terrain overlooking the Japanese main supply routes by Australian forces began affecting the supply situation of the Japanese forces around Sattelberg, as supply parties were ambushed as they attempted to deliver food and ammunition. The Australians were also short of supplies and, as a result, they paused on 21 November for resupply before the advance was resumed on the following day. The main thrust aimed for a jink where the track turned to the north. Here the 2/48^th Battalion turned to the north-east, while the 2/23^rd Battalion left the track and began advancing to the north-west toward the '3200' feature, which lay to the west of Sattelberg. Coming up against increasingly steep terrain and very strong Japanese defences around the '2200' feature, the 2/24^th Battalion unsuccessfully attempted to bypass the position and strike toward Sattelberg. On the same day, in the north, the Japanese attempted another counterattack, aiming to relieve the supply situation around Sattelberg and to recapture Finschhafen. The counterattack failed, as it was blunted by the Australian depth position around Pabu and, lacking the tempo of the earlier counterattack in October, was ultimately beaten back, with little effect on Australian operations around Sattelberg.

The fortress area round Sattelberg was methodically reduced by a five-day intensive Allied bombing effort ending on 23 November. On the same day, Japanese aircraft also undertook ground-support operations with a force of 44 aircraft which attacked the Australian positions round Jivevaneng. This did not change the situation around Sattelberg as by then the Australians had reached its southern slopes and the following day they began probing forward toward its summit. Throughout the day the Australians launched a number of attacks, but heavy defensive fire pushed these back until one platoon fought its way almost to the top. As the Australians had secured a toehold just below the summit for the night, the Japanese withdrew under the cover of darkness and the following morning the Australian advance to the mission was completed.

Although the Australian main effort shortly after the landing at 'Scarlet' beach late in September was the drive toward Finschhafen, some effort was made by the Papuan Infantry Battalion to carry out reconnaissance to the north of the main engagement area toward Bonga and Gusika, and throughout the time early in October the 2/43^rd Battalion conducted a number of patrols in the area. Intelligence gathered by these patrols and through air reconnaissance revealed that the Japanese were using tracks in the area to supply their forces in the west at Sattelberg. The Australians therefore established observation posts and after further reconnaissance it became apparent to the Australians that one hill, which they named 'Pabu' and part of a larger feature dubbed 'Horace the Horse', was the key to holding the area. Its location placed it directly astride the main Japanese supply route, and its proximity to the Australian forward positions at North Hill meant that it was in range of direct-firing Australian artillery and could therefore be occupied by a small force that could be defended by indirect fire. In the middle of October, however, amid the Japanese counterattack, Evans, commander of the Australian 24^th Brigade, had ordered the withdrawal of Australian forces on 'Pabu' as he sought to reduce the length of the Australian line in order to provide a sturdier defence of the beach-head.

After the October counterattack had been repulsed, the Australians sought to regain the initiative. Evans was replaced by Porter and Wootten decided to establish a position in depth behind the Japanese forward line, deciding to once again establish a force at 'Pabu'. On 19/20 November, three companies of the 2/32^nd Battalion occupied the position and began to attack the Japanese resupply parties that were moving through the area, inflicting heavy casualties.

Meanwhile Adachi, commander of the 18^th Army]/e], ordered Katagiri to launch another counterattack. The Japanese supply situation was acute by this stage of the campaign, with ammunition in very short supply and the men limited to one-third of their normal daily rations, but the counterattack was nevertheless scheduled for 23/24 November. However, the Australian occupation of 'Pabu' and the threat it posed to the Japanese supply route forced the Japanese commander to bring his schedule forward and also to divert some of the effort away from the recapture of Finschhafen and upon the Australian forces advancing towards Sattelberg in the south.