'Colorado' was the US deployment of Colonel Robert T. Frederick’s 1^st Special Service Force from North America to Europe (autumn 1943).

The 1^st Special Service Force was an elite US and Canadian special forces unit organised in 1942 and trained at Fort William Henry Harrison near Helena, Montana, in the continental USA, for winter operations in mountainous conditions. The unit later fought in the Aleutian islands group, Italy and southern France before being disbanded on 5 December 1944.

The origins of the 1^st Special Service Force can be found in the vision of Geoffrey Pyke, a British scientist on the strength of the Combined Operations Headquarters, for a small but high-quality military force capable of fighting behind enemy lines in winter conditions. This was envisaged as a commando unit to be landed, by sea or air, into occupied Norway, or Romania, or the Italian Alps on sabotage missions against hydroelectric plants and oilfields. In Norway, the chief industrial threat to the Allies was the creation at Rjukan of heavy water, which was used in the German atomic weapon research programme. Furthermore, Pyke believed that major attacks on Norwegian hydroelectric power stations, which supplied 49% of the country’s power, might persuade Germany to abandon its hold on the country and thereby provide the Allies a more direct link with the USSR. In Romania, there were the strategically important Ploieşti oilfields, which supplied some 25% of Germany’s requirements, and in Italy there were hydroelectric plants which supplied power for much of the industries in southern Germany. Pyke requested that a tracked vehicle be developed especially for the unit, capable of carrying men and their equipment at high speed across snow-covered terrain.

In March 1942 Pyke proposed his Project Plough concept to Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Combined Operations Headquarters. This called for Allied commandos be parachuted into the Norwegian mountains to establish a base on the Jostedalsbreen, a large glacier plateau, for guerrilla actions against the German army of occupation. These troops were to be equipped with the proposed snow vehicle, and Pyke persuaded Mountbatten that such a force would be invulnerable in its glacier strongholds and would tie down large numbers of German troops trying to dislodge it.

Given the demands upon both Combined Operations and British industry, however, it was decided to offer the concept to the USA in the same month. General George C. Marshall, Chief-of-Staff of the US Army, accepted the suggestion. As no suitable vehicle existed, in April 1941 the US government asked automobile manufacturers to look into such a design, and Studebaker subsequently created the T15 cargo carrier, which was later standardised as the M29 Weasel.

In May 1942, the Project Power concept came to the attention of Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Frederick, an officer in the Operations Division of the US General Staff. Frederick predicted Project Plough would be a military fiasco, arguing that the project tried to achieve unrealistic objectives with the number of men envisaged, that the small force would be outnumbered and overtaken in any defensive attempts to hold any area it captured, that there was no realistic manner in which the men could be evacuated after a mission, and that the project called for the troops to be parachuted into their target area and there were currently no aircraft capable of flying the troops into Norway. Frederick therefore concluded that a small force of high-quality troops could not do sufficient damage to justify the risk intro which they would be placed. Frederick therefore proposed the use of strategic bombing to achieve the project’s objectives.

Even so, Project Plough went ahead as proposed. Marshall and Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Chief of the War Plans Division and then Director of the Operations Division in the War Department General Staff, had already agreed to the operation with the British high command, and were not prepared to compromise a chance for an early opening of a US front in Europe. It was believed that Project Plough offered the possibility of paving the way for an early defeat of the Germans, opening the possibility of shifting the weight of Allied capability to the war against Japan.

The first commander of the new unit was Lieutenant Colonel Howard R. Johnson, was soon removed from his position for failing to co-operate effectively Pyke and also for arguing with Mountbatten and Eisenhower about the project’s feasibility. Johnson’s replacement was Frederick, who was suggested for the task by Mountbatten and approved by Eisenhower. Frederick was given the task of creating a fighting unit for Project Plough, and was promoted to colonel to command it. By July 1942 Frederick had eased Pyke out of the picture.

Frederick enjoyed a very high priority in obtaining equipment and training areas. As a result of its winter warfare mandate, the unit was initially to have comprised equal numbers of Canadian, Norwegian and US troops, but the lack of suitable Norwegians meant that the unit came to comprise equal numbers of Americans and Canadians.

In July 1942 James Ralston, the Canadian Minister of National Defence, approved the assignment of 697 volunteer officers and men to the project under the initial disguise that they were forming the Canadian 1^st Parachute Battalion. Shortly after it was decided to create a parachute school in Canada under this designation, so the Canadian volunteers served under the unofficial designation of Canadian 2^nd Parachute Battalion: it was only in April 1943 that they formally became the Canadian 1^st Special Service Battalion. The Canadian troops were paid by the Canadian government and subject to Canadian army discipline, but were supplied with uniforms, equipment, food, shelter and travel expenses by the USA. It was agreed that a Canadian would serve as second in command of the new 1^st Special Service Force, and that half of the officers and one third of the enlisted men would be Canadian. However, after the Canadian second in command broke his leg during parachute training, the highest ranking Canadian in the 1^st Special Service Force was Lieutenant Colonel Don Williamson, commander of the 2^nd Regiment.

The US volunteers for the force consisted initially of officers from Forts Belvoir and Benning. Recruitment letters were posted to all army units in the south-west and on Pacific coast of the continental USA. The letters called for single men, aged between 21 and 35 with three or more years of grammar school and before enlistment had worked as rangers, lumberjacks, northwoodsmen, hunters, prospectors, explorers and game wardens. Inspection teams also scoured the western camps for ideal candidates. The level of secrecy attached to the entire undertaking meant that those selected were often told that they were to be trained for a parachute unit.

The 1^st Special Service Force comprised three regiments, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel and with 32 officers and 385 men. Each regiment was divided into two battalions each of three companies each of three platoons each of two sections.

As the new force had to be trained quickly, the soldiers began parachuting within 48 hours of their arrival in Helena. The camp had no training towers and preliminary flights were not carried out, so for many their first experience at jumping was actual departure from an aeroplane. Parachute training was completed before any other training was undertaken because it was believed that if all the soldiers earned their jumping badges simultaneously a sense of camaraderie would develop within the camp.

The men were on a strict and physically demanding three-phase training schedule: from August to October parachuting, weapons and demolitions usage, small unit tactics and physical training; from October to November unit tactics and problem solving; and from November to July skiing, rock climbing, cold climate adaptation and operation of the M29 Weasel. Ski training by Norwegian instructors began in December. The men received lectures and demonstrations on skiing techniques and most had mastered the basics in two weeks. At this point the men were made to ski cross-country in formation from dawn until dusk with all of their equipment until they were up to Norwegian army standards.

As a light infantry unit destined for alpine or winter combat, the 1^st Special Service Force was equipped with much non-standard clothing, equipment and rations, including skis, parkas, haversacks and the mountain ration, and from the start was armed with several non-standard or limited-issue weapons, such as the M1941 Johnson light machine gun.

The 1^st Special Service Force was activated on 9 July 1942 as a joint Canadian and US force of three small regiments and a service battalion. Fort William Henry Harrison in Helena, Montana was chosen as the primary training location as a result of its flat terrain for airborne training and its close proximity to mountains for ski and winter training. After its initial training period in Montana, the force was relocated to Camp Bradford, Virginia, on 15 April 1943, and then to Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, on 23 May 1943. On 4 July 1943 the 1^st Special Service Force reached San Francisco for embarkation and deployment, from 10 July, in the Aleutian islands group. On 15 August the 1^st Special Service Force was part of the 'Cottage' invasion of Kiska island but, after it had been discovered that the island had recently been evacuated by its Japanese occupiers, it re-embarked and returned to California before going back to Fort Ethan Allen, which it arrived on 9 September.

The original Project Plough parachute parachute into German-occupied Norway had already been abandoned, but in October 1943 Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the US 5^th Army, brought the 1^st Special Service Force to Italy, and here its men demonstrated the value of their unique skills and training. The 1^st Special Service Force had arrived in Casablanca in French Morocco in November 1943 and quickly moved to the Italian front, reaching Naples on 19 November and immediately going into the line with the US 36^th Division.

The 1^st Special Service Force was allocated the task of taking two heavily fortified German positions in the Italian mountains. These positions were on Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea, and were both held by Oberst Karl Ens’s 104^th Panzergrenadierregiment with elements of Generalleutnant Paul Conrath’s Panzerdivision 'Hermann Göring' in reserve. The significance of these two mountain positions lay in their position relative to the 'Gustav-Linie', for they were outlying elements of this line in the 'Bernhardt-Linie'. Centred on Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea, this constituted the last German entrenched line before the 'Gustav-Linie'. Operationally, the mountains provided a commanding view of the countryside and highway, giving the German artillery on the mountains control of the surrounding area. The German artillery on the top of Monte la Difensa also had at its disposal a new weapon, the Nebelwerfer artillery rocket-launcher.

The paths up Monte la Difensa were scouted by the men of the 1^st Special Service Force before the unit’s attack, and it was reported to Lieutenant Colonel T. C. MacWilliam, who was to lead the 2^nd Regiment in its assault, that the best way to approach the German positions was up an almost vertical escarpment over the right of the hill mass. The use of this line of approach offered the 1^st Special Service Force the possibility of catching the Germans completely unaware, for earlier Allied attacks had been head-on assaults. The attack was scheduled for 2 December, and before this the men received additional training in mountain climbing and tactics at their temporary barracks at Santa Maria.

Frederick’s plan ordained that 16.30 on 1 December, the 2^nd Regiment would be trucked to within 6 miles (9.7 km) of the base of the mountain and then make a 6-hour march the rest of the way to Monte la Difensa. The 1^st Regiment, together with elements of Major General Fred L. Walker’s 36^th Division, would be the reserve. The 3^rd Regiment would be split in two, half to supply the 2^nd Regiment following the initial assault and the other half to be in reserve with the 1^st Regiment and the elements of 36^th Infantry Division.

After reaching the base of the mountain and having had a single night’s rest, the 600 men of the 2^nd Regiment started their ascent of Monte la Difensa at dusk on 2 December 2 under cover of a heavy artillery barrage. The 2^nd Regiment came within range of the German positions at midnight and began to climb the final cliff, which jutted upward some 1,000 ft (305 m) at an angle of 65°. The men climbed with ropes tied to one another, and were soon soaked by freezing rain. Reaching the top, MacWilliam signalled his men to move forward into a depression in front of the German position. The men had been ordered to hold their fire until 06.00, but the Germans became aware of the 2^nd Regiment’s presence after some of this rrgiment’s men tripped over loose gravel while moving along the crest of the mountain, and fired flares into the air. Through artillery and mortar fire, the men of the 2^nd Regiment managed to set up several machine guns and return fire sufficient to overwhelm the German defence. The 5^th Army’s staff had estimated that the battle would last some four to five days, but within two hours the Germans on Monte la Difensa had fallen back to the Monte la Remetanea.

US and British forces had suffered many casualties in earlier and wholly futile attempts to take the important Camino Ridge. The 1^st Special Service Force had now been successful in taking its initial objective, Monte la Difensa, but was delayed in reaching and taking its major objective, Monte la Remetanea (Hill 907). The first stage of the attack on Hill 907 was halted after the death of MacWilliam, the commander of the 1^st Battalion, and although he wished not to check the current momentum of the 1^st Special Service Force, Frederick ordered a halt to allow reinforcements and supplies to reach the leading troops. The 1^st Special Service Force dug in on Monte la Difensa in expectation of a German counterattack, but the Allies' massive artillery bombardment combined with the flooding of both the Rapido and Garigliano rivers to prevent the Germans from re-forming. While waiting for the orders to resume the attack of Monte la Remetanea, the 2^nd Regiment was resupplied by the 1^st and 3^rd Regiments.

Once the British forces broke through the German line at Monte Camino, the 1^st Special Service Force was ordered to complete the attack on the primary objective, Hill 907. The 1^st Special Service Force immediately continued its attack, assaulting Monte la Remetanea from 6 to 9 December. It captured Hill 720, starting from Monte Sammucro on 25 December, and after difficulties assaulted Monte Maio and Monte Vischiataro almost simultaneously on 8 January 1944. During the mountain campaign the 1^st Special Service Force suffered 77% casualties: the 511 losses were 91 dead, nine missing, 313 wounded, and 116 pulled out with exhaustion. The 1^st Special Service Force was then relieved by the 142^nd Infantry.

Following the 1943 inter-Allied 'Quadrant' conference at Quebec, Eisenhower was moved to London to plan and lead 'Overlord', and command of the Mediterranean theatre passed to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. General the Hon. Sir Harold Alexander, commanding the Allied 15^th Army Group in Italy, had formulated the 'Shingle' plan to land Allied troops at Anzio in order to outflank the German positions in the 'Gustav-Linie'. The German commander in Italy, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, was able to group four German divisions to prevent the enlargement of the 'Shingle' beach-head at Anzio, the Axis total of some 70,000 men including the Conrath’s Panzerdivision 'Hermann Göring', and the 35^th Panzergrenadierregiment of SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Max Simon’s 16^th SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Reichsführer-SS'.

The 1^st Special Service Force was withdrawn from the mountains in January, and on 1 February was landed in the 'Shingle' beach-head to replace the 1^st and 3^rd Ranger Battalions, which had suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Cisterna. The 1^st Special Service Force’s task was to hold and raid from the right-hand flank of the beach-head marked by the Mussolini Canal and Pontine marshes. The 1^st Regiment was positioned on the force’s right, which comprised one-third of the force’s area of responsibility, while the 3^rd Regiment guarded the remaining two-thirds. Reduced to three companies following the attacks on Monti la Difensa, Sammucio and Maio, the 2^nd Regiment made night patrols into Axis territory and, soon after the 1^st Special Service Force took over the Mussolini Canal sector, German units pulled back some 900 yards (825 m) to avoid this aggressive patrols, but even so the constant night raids forced Kesselring to hold the German positions in this area with more men than he had originally planned.

When the 'Buffalo' breakout of Major General Lucian K. Truscott’s US VI Corps from the Anzio beach-head began on 23 May 1944, the 1^st Special Service Force was launched against Monte Arrestino, and attacked Rocca Massima on 27 May. The 1^st Special Service Force was next given the task of capturing, and thus preventing the German destruction of, seven bridges in Rome as the US 5^th Army entered the city. During the night of 3/4 June men of the force were among the first US troops to enter Rome. After securing the bridges, the 1^st Special Service Force moved north in pursuit of the retreating Germans.

In August 1944 the 1^st Special Service Force came under the command of Colonel Edwin A. Walker as Brigadier General Frederick, who had commanded the force since its earliest days, left on promotion to major general to command the 1^st Airborne Task Force in the 'Dragoon' landing in southern France.

On 14 August men of the 1^st Special Service Force landed on Port Cros island and the Iles d’Hyères during 'Dragoon', and fought the small Battle of Port Cros, in which they captured the five forts on the islands. Nine men were killed in action or died of wounds received in combat. On 22 August the 1^st Special Service Force was attached to the 1^st Airborne Task Force, a provisional airborne division of Lieutenant General Alexander McC. Patch’s 7^th Army, and later was made an organic part of the the 1^st Airborne Task Force. On 7 September it moved with the 1^st Airborne Task Force to defensive positions on the Franco-Italian border.

During the war the 1,800-man 1^st Special Service Force accounted for some 12,000 German casualties, captured some 7,000 prisoners, and sustained an attrition rate of more than 600%.

The 1^st Special Service Force was disbanded on 5 December 1944 in a field near Menton, on the extreme south-eastern edge of France’s Mediterranean coast. The capture of this little town had been one of the 1^st Special Service Force’s hardest tasks, and took place on 26 August. The Canadian troops were sent to Canadian units, most of the men becoming replacements for the Canadian 1^st Parachute Battalion. Some of the Americans were sent to airborne divisions as replacements, others to Ranger battalions, and still others formed the 474^th Infantry, which served with Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s US 3^rd Army and performed occupation duty in Norway.