'Eisteufel' was a U-boat wolfpack operation in the Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean, in combination with the 'Rösselsprung' (i) surface ship attack, against the PQ.17 convoy (21 June/12 July 1942).

The wolfpack comprised U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-408, U-456, U-457 and U-657, and for the loss of none of its own number sank 13 ships (83,019 tons).

After 'Barbarossa' drew the USSR into World War II on the side of the Allies, the British and US governments agreed to send unconditional aid to the Soviets. The Anglo-US Beaverbrook-Harriman mission visited Moscow in October 1941, and agreed with the Soviets the shipment of munitions. The most direct way to carry these supplies was by sea to the east past the North Cape of German-occupied Norway, through Arctic waters, to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangyel’sk. The agreement stated that the Soviet government was responsible for accepting the supplies in Soviet ships at British or US ports, but as the USSR lacked the numbers of ships needed to carry the quantities of aid being sent by the Western allies, British and US ships began to accept an increasing proportion of the burden.

Although the defence of the Arctic convoys was primarily the responsibility of the Royal Navy, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King assigned Task Force 39, centred on the fleet carrier Wasp and battleship Washington, to support the British.

The 'Dervish' first convoy sailed from the UK in August 1941, two months after the German invasion of the USSR, and by the spring of 1942, 12 more convoys had made the passage with the loss of only one out of 103 ships. From this time on, however, the threat of German attacks on the convoys increased as the Germans appreciated the importance of halting the flow of supplies to the USSR with every means at their disposal, including the basing of heavy warships in Norway. In the previous year the Kriegsmarine had already begun to concentrate its main surface ship strength in Norway during the winter, both to prevent British attack, and to interdict the Allied supply route to the USSR. The battleship Tirpitz was moved to Trondheim in January 1942, and was joined by the pocket battleship Admiral Scheer and in March by the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper. The Germans' initial scheme had also called for the battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen to arrive in Arctic waters, but all three of these major warships fell victim to British air attacks, and had to turn back for repairs.

The Germans had bases along the length of Norway, and this meant that until numbers of escort carriers became available, Allied convoys had to be routed through these areas without adequate defence against warplane and U-boat attack.

PQ.17 was the eighteenth of the PQ series of Allied convoys via the Arctic route to the ports of the northern USSR, took place between 27 June and 17 July, and suffered the heaviest losses of any of the PQ convoys, 25 out of 36 merchant ships being lost.

During the passage of the preceding PQ convoys, the rate of Allied losses to German aircraft and U-boat attack had increased steadily, culminating in May 1942 with PQ.16 which lost seven ships, but the following PQ.17 convoy was the largest and most valuable convoy to date, with military equipment valued at more than US$700 million. Even so, the Germans had been spurred by the relative Allied success with PQ.16 to reinforce their efforts to break the convoy route to Arkhangyel’sk and Murmansk, and 'Rösselsprung' was the concentration of naval surface forces to achieve this.

In June British naval intelligence reported that the Germans planned to commit a substantial force of surface warships to intercept and destroy the next eastbound convoy, in the area to the east of Bjørnøya. This meant that even while attacking the convoy, the German warships would still be operating comparatively close to the Norwegian coast, and would therefore be able to return swiftly to base should the tactical situation make it necessary, and would also have the support of shore-based air reconnaissance and attack forces; there was also to be a screen of U-boats in the channels between Spitsbergen and Norway. Any Allied covering forces, on the other hand, would be lacking in any air support, would be operating 1,000 miles (1600 km) or more from their nearest bases, and would include destroyers which would lack the fuel reserves to escort any damaged ships to a safe harbour.

The Admiralty was also conscious of these tactical and operational facts and, to mitigate them, issued instructions on 27 June to allow the convoy to be turned back temporarily in order to shorten the distance to the nearest Allied base. In the event, the German surface ship movements took place later than had been expected, making these instructions unnecessary.

The Admiralty also instructed that the safety of the convoy from surface attack to the west of Bjørnøya depended on Allied surface forces, and to this island’s east on submarines. Furthermore, the convoy’s cruiser covering force was not to pass into the area to the east of Bjørnøya unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a German surface force which the cruiser force could engage successfully, and not to go beyond 25° E under any circumstance.

It was also thought sensible to divert German attentions with a decoy convoy, and this was organised on the basis of the 1^st Minelaying Squadron and four colliers, escorted by the light cruisers Sirius and Curacoa, five destroyers, and a number of anti-submarine trawlers. This diversionary force assembled at Scapa Flow for a week, and departed two days after the convoy. German reconnaissance of Scapa Flow during the period in which the decoy convoy was being assembled did not note the diversion, which was also not sighted on its passage. The operation was repeated on 1 July, again without success.

Additionally, on 26 June the Admiralty took the opportunity to pass the QP.13 westbound convoy as the reciprocal of PQ.17. QP.13 comprised merchant ships returning from Arkhangelsk and supplemented by others from Murmansk. QP.13 consisted of 35 ships and was escorted by five destroyers, three corvettes, one anti-aircraft ship, three minesweepers, two trawlers and, as far as the area of Bjørnøya, one submarine. It was sighted by German aircraft on 30 June and 2 July, but was not attacked as the German tactic was to concentrate on eastbound convoys with laden ships rather than westbound convoys with most of the ships in ballast.

A fresh ice reconnaissance on 3 July found that the passage to the north of Bjørnøya had widened, and the Admiralty suggested that the convoy should pass at least 50 miles (80 km) to the north of the island. Commander J. E. Broome, who commanded the escort, preferred to remain in the low visibility provided by the original route, and to make ground to the eastward. Rear Admiral L. H. K. Hamilton, in command of the cruiser squadron, later decided that a more northerly route was necessary, and therefore ordered Broome to alter the convoy’s course to pass 70 miles (115 km) to the north of Bjørnøya and, later, to open the distance from Banak, the Germans' most northerly bomber base, to 400 miles (645 km).

There had been some Allied argument about the advisability of postponing the convoy until the autumn or winter of 1942, when shorter days would offer greater protection against air reconnaissance and attack, but political considerations had prevailed over naval caution, and the convoy departed the Hvalfjördur in Iceland on 27 June as 36 laden ships bound for Murmansk under the command of Commodore John Dowding.

On 26 June the 12 unladen ships of the QP.13 homeward bound convoy had departed Arkhangyel’sk for Murmansk, and on 27 June, now with 23 ships, the convoy sailed from Murmansk. The eastern local escort force between 26 and 28 June comprised the Soviet destroyers Grozny, Gremyashchy and Kuybyshev as well as the British minesweepers Bramble, Hazard, Leda and Seagull. The ocean escort from 26 June to 1 July comprised the submarines Trident and Seawolf, to 3 July the destroyers Inglefield and Intrepid, and between 5 and 7 July the minesweepers Niger and Hussar, corvettes Honeysuckle, Hyderabad, Starwort and Free French Roselys, and the auxiliary anti-aircraft ship Alynbank, as well as the destroyers Achates, Volunteer and Free Polish Garland, and anti-submarine trawlers Lady Madeleine and St Elstan.

As noted above, the reciprocal PQ.17 convoy comprised 36 ships, the fleet oilers Grey Ranger and Aldersdale escorted by the destroyer Douglas, and three rescue ships. The 7,191-ton US Richard Bland ran aground and had to be towed back to Iceland, the 5,728-ton US West Gotomska suffered mechanical problems just out of port and was forced to turn back, and the 4,969-ton US Exford turned back after suffering ice damage after part of the convoy ran into drifting ice in thick weather of the Denmark Strait. Grey Ranger was also damaged, her speed being reduced to 8 kt. It was now doubtful if the oiler could survive an encounter with heavy weather, so it was decided to transfer her to the refuelling position to the north-east of Jan Mayen island in exchange for Aldersdale.

PQ.17’s ocean escort from 27 June to 4 July comprised the destroyer Middleton, minesweepers Britomart, Halcyon and Salamander, and anti-submarine trawlers Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton and Northern Gem. Close escort was the responsibility of Broome’s 1^st Escort Group (destroyers Keppel, Fury, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa and Wilton, corvettes Dianella, Lotus, Poppy and Free French Malouine, auxiliary anti-aircraft ships Palomares and Pozarica, and submarines P614 and P615).

On 28/29 June Admiral Sir John Tovey’s distant cover force of the Home Fleet (battleships Duke of York and US Washington, fleet carrier Victorious, heavy cruiser Cumberland, light cruiser Nigeria, and destroyers Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland, and US Mayrant and Rhind later supplemented by another two destroyers) departed Scapa Flow in the Orkney islands group for the area between Iceland and Bjørnøya, where it was to track the convoy at a distance of some 200 miles (320 km) until the latter had passed the North Cape.

Its route took the PQ.17 convoy close to the more northern islands of the Svalbard archipelago, to the north of Bjørnøya, and skirted the edge of the pack ice before turning to the south and following the coast of Novaya Zemlya before turning to the south-west across the Barents Sea and entering the White Sea, where it turned almost due south.

On 30 June the QP.13 convoy was located in the Barents Sea by German air reconnaissance but was not earmarked for attack because the target of the forthcoming German operation was the PQ.17 convoy.

Hamilton’s close cover force (1^st Cruiser Squadron with the heavy cruisers London, Norfolk, and US Tuscaloosa and Wichita, and destroyers Somali and US Rowan and Wainwright) departed the Seyðisfjörður in eastern Iceland for a position to the north of the convoy.

The route to be taken by PQ.17 was longer than those of earlier convoys, for the retreat of the pack ice allowed for a passage to the north of Bjørnøya and also an evasive detour in the Barents Sea. Moreover, all the ships of the convoy were bound for Arkhangyel’sk as recent German air raids had destroyed most of Murmansk.

On 1 July the German navy’s B-Dienst signals interception and decryption service located the convoy, which was also sighted and reported in the morning by U-255 and U-408 in a position about 70 miles (112.5 km) to the east of Jan Mayen island. U-334 and U-456 were ordered to close on the convoy without delay, and U-88, U-251, U-355, U-376, U-457 and U-657 to establish a patrol line farther to the east as the 'Eisteufel' wolfpack.

The PQ.17 convoy was sighted, reported and then tracked by Kapitänleutnant Max-Martin Teichert’s U-456 from a time soon after it entered the open sea. German information about the convoy’s composition, escort and movement was augmented from 1 July by Blohm und Voss Bv 138 flying boats of the Luftwaffe, which reported both the convoy and the distant cover force during the afternoon.

On 2 July German air reconnaissance, by machines of Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff’s Norway-based Luftflotte V, and U-88 located and reported the QP.13 convoy, which passed the PQ.17 convoy on the opposite course during the afternoon. The sighting of both convoys and the mistaken reporting of the close covering force as the distant escort by German air reconnaissance led to a measure of German confusion.

PQ.17 suffered its first air attack, by nine Heinkel He 115 torpedo bomber floatplanes of the 1./Küstenfliegergruppe 906, later in the same day. The aircraft were unsuccessful, and one of them was shot down. At 13.00 on 3 July, PQ.17’s destroyer screen was steering east to pass between Bjørnøya and Spitsbergen.

U-456 maintained contact with the PQ.17 convoy, but U-255, U-376, U-457 and U-657 were kept at a distance as they tried to attack. During the afternoon Admiral Otto Schniewind’s Gruppe I (battleship Tirpitz, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, destroyers Karl Galster, Friedrich Ihn, Hans Lody and Theodor Riedel, and torpedo boats T-7 and T-15) departed Trondheim for northern Norway as the launch point for 'Rösselsprung'.

On 3 July Vizeadmiral Oskar Kummetz’s Gruppe II (pocket battleships Lützow and Admiral Scheer, and destroyers Z-24, Z-27, Z-28, Z-29, Z-30 and Richard Beitzen) departed Narvik for the Altafjord and a rendezvous with Gruppe I, which had arrived together with the destroyers Erich Steinbrinck and Friedrich Eckoldt. But Lützow, Hans Lody, Karl Galster and Theodor Riedel were declared unserviceable after going aground in the Grimsøystraumen.

Meanwhile the Germans had lost air contact as a result of poor visibility. U-88 made an unsuccessful attack on destroyers, but U-255, U-334, U-456, U-657 and U-703 all managed to achieve only brief contacts.

British air reconnaissance established that the German surface ships had left the Altafjord and were heading to the north. A British submarine force (Sahib, Sturgeon, Unrivalled, Unshaken and Free French Minerve) were stationed in one line, and another (Seawolf, Tribune, Trident and Ursula) in a second, off Bjørnøya to provide additional cover for the convoy. In the area there were also the Soviet submarines D-3, K-2, K-21, K-22, Shch-402, Shch-403 and M-176, among other boats, and these were patrolling off the Varangerfjord. In these operations, D-3 and M-176 were lost, probably in German minefields. The light cruiser Manchester and destroyer Eclipse arrived from Spitsbergen to strengthen the distant cover force.

On 4 July an He 115 twin-engined floatplane of the 1./KFlGr 906 obtained hits on the 7,191-ton US Christopher Newport, whose wreck was later sunk by the British submarine P614 and Fregattenkapitän Karl Brandenburg’s U-457. U-88, U-225 and U-334 made brief contact with the convoy, and U-457 with the cruiser force, but U-88's two attacks failed.

In the evening six bombers of Oberstleutnant Erich Bloedorn’s Kampfgeschwader 30 made an unsuccessful attack, and then later in the same evening 25 torpedo bombers of the I/KG 26 sank the 4,841-ton British Navarino, damaged the 7,177-ton US William Hooper which was later sunk by Kapitänleutnant Hilmar Siemon’s U-334, and torpedoed the 6,114-ton Soviet tanker Azerbaijan. The Germans lost three of the 25 Heinkel He 111 torpedo bombers which launched this attack.

At 12.30 on 4 July, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to proceed to the east of 25° E, should the situation demand, unless contrary orders were received from Tovey. This was a reversal of previous orders. As no information in Tovey’s possession justified this change, Hamilton was ordered to withdraw when the convoy was to the east of 25° E, or earlier at his discretion, unless the Admiralty assured him that Tirpitz would not be met. However, at 18.58 the Admiralty signalled Hamilton that further information was expected shortly and instructed him to remain with the convoy pending further instructions.

In the evening Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, came to what he believed was the correct overall appreciation of the German intentions using information transmitted by the British naval attaché in Stockholm on the basis of details of the German operational order, which had been decoded by Swedish intelligence from an intercepted teleprinter message. Moreover, he was unconvinced by purely 'negative' intelligence about the German force and therefore expected a German surface attack in superior strength. Pound agonised for several hours before making the decision which proved to be fateful. Reasoning that Tirpitz, with her high speed and 380-mm (15-in) guns, would inflict massive losses on closely grouped merchant ships.

At 21.11, the Admiralty sent a message, prefixed 'Most Immediate' ordering Hamilton to withdraw to the westward at high speed.

This was a result of U-boat information, a fact which was not shared with Hamilton. At 21.23, the Admiralty in a message prefixed 'Immediate' ordered the convoy to disperse and proceed to Russian ports owing to threat from surface ships. Again, at 21.36, the Admiralty sent another 'Most Immediate' message, ordering the convoy to scatter.

Hamilton, Broome, and Dowding took these signals to indicate an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. The convoy was immediately ordered to scatter, with the escorting destroyers ordered to join the cruiser force and the merchantmen to proceed independently. The Admiralty’s decision and orders would not have been so vehement had only British warships been concerned, but the idea the first joint Anglo-US operation under British command might involve the destruction of US as well as British units may well have influenced the decisions of Pound, the first sea lord. The Allied cruiser squadron was already beyond the standing orders set by the Admiralty; hence, if no new orders had gone out, the cruisers would have had to withdraw some time afterwards in any case. The earlier cruiser movement did not influence the tactical situation. However, in light of later knowledge, the decision was deemed precipitous.

At 21.11 Pound sent a message, prefixed 'Most Immediate', ordering Hamilton to withdraw to the west at high speed. This was a decision based on information about U-boat positions, a fact which was not shared with Hamilton. At 21.23, Pound sent another message, prefixed 'Immediate' to order the convoy to disperse and proceed to independently to Soviet ports as a result of the threat from surface ships. Again, at 21.36, Pound made another 'Most Immediate' signal, this time ordering the convoy to scatter.

Hamilton, Broome and Dowding assumed that this trio of signals indicated an imminent attack by Tirpitz. The convoy was immediately instructed to scatter and proceed independently, and the escorting destroyers were ordered to join the cruiser force. Pound’s decision and orders would not have been so strongly worded had it been only British warships concerned, but the notion the first joint Anglo/US operation under British command might involve the destruction of US as well as British units may well have influenced his decisions. The cruiser squadron was already beyond the limit of standing orders set by the Admiralty so, if no new orders had gone out, the cruisers would in any event have had to withdraw soon after this. The earlier cruiser movement did not influence the tactical situation but, in light of later knowledge, the decision came to be seen as precipitate.

When the receipt of the order to scatter, the convoy had completed more than half of its passage and lost only three ships. The consequences for the merchant vessels from this time onward were disastrous. The ships were soon spread over a wide area, and were stripped of mutual protection as well as most of the trained escort: with the majority of the escorts ordered to return to Scapa Flow, only the close escort of auxiliary anti-aircraft ships, corvettes, minesweepers and armed trawlers was left to attempt to protect the scattered convoy. As soon as they learned of it, the Germans began to take full advantage of this situation.

On 5 July German air reconnaissance and U-boats reported both the departure of the cruisers and destroyers to the west, and the scattering of the convoy. As a result Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, Admiral Scheer, seven destroyers and two torpedo boats were ordered to put to sea, and off Ingøy the Soviet submarine K-21 made an unsuccessful attack on Tirpitz.

During this day all three Gruppen of the KG 30 attacked the convoy’s merchant vessels as they steamed singly or in small groups, sinking the 5,564-ton US Washington, 5,203-ton British Bolton Castle, 5,644-ton US Pan Kraft, 6,476-ton US Peter Kerr and 5,686-ton US Fairfield City, as well as the 1,559-ton British rescue ship Zaafaran. The aircraft also damaged the 7,168-ton Dutch Paulus Potter, 7,195-ton British Earlston which was later sunk by U-334, 6,645-ton British Empire Byron which was later sunk by Kapitänleutnant Heinz Bielfeld’s U-703, and 8,402-ton British oiler Aldersdale. Kapitänleutnant Heino Bohmann’s U-88 sank the 5,127-ton US Carlton and 7,177-ton US Daniel Morgan, Kapitänleutnant Max-Martin Teichert’s U-456 the 6,977-ton US Honomu, and Bielfeld’s U-703 the 5,479-ton British River Afton.

A Consolidated Catalina flying boat of the RAF’s No. 210 Squadron and the submarine Unshaken sighted and reported the German surface force, and a short time later Unshaken was depth-charged by the destroyer Z-27, but escaped without damage.

After the early and intercepted reports by British submarines and aircraft, Grossadmiral Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the German navy, ordered 'Rösselsprung' (i) to be terminated in accordance with Adolf Hitler’s directive that the major surface warships were not to be risked when their was the likelihood of stronger British naval forces in the offing. Thus the task of intercepting and destroying the PQ.17’s remaining ships fell to the U-boats and aircraft.

Steaming in the opposite direction, and now some distance from scattered elements of the PQ.17 convoy, in conditions of fog and storm, the QP.13 convoy inadvertently entered one of the British minefields in the Denmark Strait and lost the minesweeper Niger and the 7,611-ton US Heffron, 6,120-ton US Hybert, 5,828-ton US Massmar and 4,441-ton Soviet Rodina; the 7,191-ton US John Randolph and 6,115-ton Panamanian Exterminator were badly damaged and had to be written off.

On 6 July the German surface warships entered the Kåfjord, and the British cruiser force joined the distant cover force. Aircraft of the KG 30 returned to the attack on this day to sink the 5,411-ton US tanker Pan Atlantic, and Kapitänleutnant Reinhart Reche’s U-255 torpedoed and sank the 7,191-ton US John Witherspoon. On the next day the U-boats deployed to hunt the single ships still at sea: Kapitänleutnant Reinhart Reche’s U-255 sank the 5,116-ton US Alcoa Ranger, Kapitänleutnant Günter La Baume’s U-355 the 5,082-ton British Hartlebury, and Brandenburg’s U-457 the abandoned Aldersdale.

On receiving the third order to scatter on 4 July 1942, Temporary Lieutenant Leo Gradwell of the Royal Naval Reserve, commanding the 575-ton anti-submarine trawler Ayrshire decided that as he was heading north to the Arctic ice shelf, nothing prevented him from escorting merchantmen. Leading his little convoy (6,428-ton Troubador, 5,685-ton US Ironclad and 4,937-ton US Silver Sword), Gradwell headed north using only a sextant and The Times World Geographic Pocket Book. On reaching the Arctic ice pack, the convoy found itself stuck fast, and so the ships stopped engines and then banked their fires. Gradwell arranged a defence based on the fact that Troubador was carrying a cargo of bunkering coal and drums of white paint: the crews painted all the vessels white, covered decks with white linen, and arranged the Sherman medium tanks on the merchant vessels decks into a defensive formation, with loaded main guns. After a period of waiting, and having evaded the reconnoitring Luftwaffe aircraft, the four vessels found themselves unstuck they proceeded to the Matochkin Strait, where they were found by a corvette force which escorted the four-ship convoy plus two other merchant vessels to Arkhangyel’sk, where they arrived on 25 July.

Five ships and some of the escort vessels arrived in the Matochkin Strait. On 8 July Reche’s U-255 sank the 6,069-ton US Olopana off Novaya Zemlya, and in the Matochkin Strait Dowding managed to put together a small convoy of five merchant ships, three minesweepers, three corvettes, three trawlers, the anti-aircraft ships Palomares and Pozarica, and rescue ship Zamalek. This made it way along the west coast of Novaya Zemlya and the ice barrier, and was later boosted in strength by the arrival of the Soviet destroyers Gremyashchy and Grozny to reinforce the escort.

On 9 July part of the convoy (1,600-ton rescue ship Rathlin, 7,925-ton Soviet tanker Donbas and 5,345-ton US Bellingham) reached Arkhangyel’sk.

However, Reche’s U-255 re-established contact with the rest of the convoy, and the Germans grouped U-251, U-376, U-457 and U-703 to tackle this. On 10 July the II/KG 30 attacked the rest of the convoy off the entrance to the White Sea, damaging the 5,060-ton US Hoosier and 5,255-ton Panamanian El Capitan which were then sunk by Kapitänleutnant Friedrich-Karl Marks’s U-376 and Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Timm’s U-251 respectively, and also damaging the 7,191-ton US Samuel Chase.

On 11 July the rest of the convoy, comprising Zamalek, 7,173-ton British Ocean Freedom and Samuel Chase, reached Arkhangyel’sk.

On 12 July U-376 made an unsuccessful attack on a trawler off Kanin Noss, and on the following next day Reche’s U-255 of the homebound boats sank the abandoned wreck of Paulus Potter. The U-boats had returned to base by 15 July.

Dowding set out on 16 July with the corvettes Poppy, Lotus and Malouine, accompanied by the Soviet destroyer Gremyashchiy, to bring in the ships anchored off the coast of Novaya Zemlya. Between 20 and 24 July the second remnant of the convoy, comprising the same escort vessels and the 7,191-ton US Benjamin Harrison, Silver Sword, Troubadour, Ironclad and 6,114-ton Soviet Azerbaijan, led by the Soviet icebreaker Murman and trawler Kerov, reached Arkhangyel’sk from the Matochkin Strait together with the 6,978-ton British Empire Tide which was collected in Moller Bay. On 28 July the 6,223-ton US Winston Salem, which had been delayed by running aground, became the last straggler to arrive in Molotovsk.

The losses of the PQ.17 convoy thus totalled 24 ships (142,695 tons), while the German losses were a mere five aircraft in 202 sorties.

Eight ships (48,218 tons) had succumbed to direct U-boat attack and another eight (40,376 tons) to air attack, and in addition another eight vessels (54,093 tons) had been damaged by air attack before being sent to the bottom by U-boats. In all, the Allies had suffered the loss of cargoes including 3,350 vehicles, 430 tanks, 210 aircraft and 99,316 tons of other matériel.

Two of the surviving ships, Silver Sword and Bellingham, were sunk on the return journey, one of them the fifth victim of Reche’s U-255.

It was inevitable after this disaster that, despite Soviet protests, the sailing of the next convoy, PQ.18, was postponed until September, and then with a revised defensive arrangement comprising a very strong constant close escort of 16 destroyers and the first of the new escort carriers, Avenger, carrying 12 fighters. The Arctic convoys were then suspended until once more the advent of the longer hours of darkness during the polar winter allowed the sailing of the outward-bound PQ.19 and inward-bound JW.51 convoys in December 1942.