'Frühlingsfest' was a German anti-partisan operation, in concert with 'Regenschauer', in the area of Lepel and Polotsk in the Belorussian part of the German-occupied western USSR (17 March/12 May 1944).

The anti-partisan forces available in Belorussia in the spring of 1944 were were very mixed, and here Generalleutnant Alfred Jacobi’s 201^st Sicherungsdivision not only controlled its own regiments but served as the umbrella organisation for many other security units. The formation was also responsible for the protection of the main German administrative centres at Polotsk and Vitebsk, and in furtherance of Germany’s programme to wring all possible economic advantage out of the area was additionally tasked with supporting the regional and local Belorussian administration’s appointed mayors and village elders. Thus the division supervised the Ordnungsdienst (order police) responsible for daily policing of the civil population, but had no mandate to intervene in the affairs of the Sicherheitsdienst (security service) of the SS or the Sicherheitspolizei (security police), which included the Gestapo.

The personnel of the 201^st Sicherungsdivision were older Germans and Austrians of the Landwehr (men aged between 25 and 45 as well a those with disabilities or injuries) together with a miscellany of Lithuanians, Russians and Belorussians, and included some cavalry and even a few armoured vehicles. It suffered from a severe shortage of motor vehicles of all types, and its weapons were poor and indeed outclassed by those of the partisans it was fighting. The partisans often had greater numbers of superior machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-tank rifles and even medium mortars and light artillery. The 201^st Sicherungsdivision and comparable formations were equipped largely with captured Polish, Belgian, Dutch, French and Czechoslovak equipment, so the diversity of calibres even at this level presented major logistical challenges. The equipment limitations combined with the fact that most of the personnel were the old, the young and the infirm of the Landesschützen (local defence forces of older men) deemed unsuitable for first-line service. Moreover, the officers were some of the worst Germany could provide, and all these factors meant that the Sicherungsdivisionen were both poorly equipped and poorly led, and thus generally of poor motivation.

The area behind the German front line was divided into three zones. The first of these was the Gefechtsgebiet (combat zone), in which there were front-line formations and immediately behind them a German military administration: here security was maintained by elements of the front-line corps. The second zone was the Korück (army rear area), one behind each army and each in charge of supply and also of its own security, the latter being maintained in populated areas and along lines of communication by the Feldgendarmerie (military police). Each Korück was under the direct command of the army chief of supply and administration, and the Korück behind each Heeresgruppe had a Rückwärtige Heeresbebiete (rear headquarters) and attached security divisions. The third and last zone was then the Heimat Kriegsgebiet (zone of the interior), which was not administered by the military.

Each Sicherungsdivision initially had one regular infantry regiment, one regular artillery battalion and one Landesschütz (home guard) regiment. The regular infantry regiment operated as Eingreifgruppen (alert units). The Landesschütz regiment had three or four Landesschützen battalions and one Wach (watch) battalion. The Landesschützen battalions comprised mostly older men (Landwehr aged 35-45), reservists and injured. Additional units of signals and engineers, of a size smaller than those of front-line divisions, were also included. Each division also had one Ordnungspolizei motorised police battalion.

In overall terms equipment and training were poor, and except in the Ordnungspolizei battalions, motor vehicles were rare. Each division had one or two battalions equipped with bicycles for local patrolling. Except for the Eingreifgruppen and Ordnungspolizei battalions, which were well armed and equipped, the Sicherungsdivision’s other units were therefore poorly equipped, led and motivated.

The regular infantry regiment was held in reserve to tackle partisan activity, and was also tasked with filling gaps in the line in the event of a Soviet breakthrough.

The situation in Belorussia until the spring of 1943 was so fluid there was no continuous front, and the Eingreifgruppen were often used to block major Soviet incursions. The Ordnungspolizei battalion was usually divided into smaller units to deal with general policing and the maintenance of security on the primary lines of communication. The Landesschützenregimenter and Wachbataillone were trained for the defence of supply depots and barracks, and for patrol of lines of communication. The battalions were divided into area garrisons down to platoon level. Mobilised local forces (Ostbataillone) were used for static defence and reconnaissance, but were not employed for offensive work unless absolutely necessary, and then only under constant and direct German command.

The 201^st Sicherungsdivision was based on Landwehr or third-line units, and formed in June 1942 from the headquarters and support units of the 201^st Sicherungsbrigade. The division operated in the rear of Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' on security operations near Polotsk until April 1943, when it was attached to Generaloberst Georg-Hans Reinhardt’s 3^rd Panzerarmee near Nevel for 'Zitadelle'. The division was destroyed in June and July 1944.

Before this, from the later part of 1943 into the spring of 1944, when the Soviets were preparing 'Bagration', the railway lines and their associated infrastructure such as bridges in the southern part of the Korück of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' came under increasingly heavy pressure from partisan attacks. By 1 May 1944 the 7,000 men and women of five partisan brigades were concentrating their attacks on a 50-mile (80-km) stretch of the army group’s primary railway supply line between Roslavl and Bryansk; another 6,500 men and women of six brigades were attacking the rail line linking Bryansk and Lgov; another group of partisan brigades numbering 5,000 persons were attacking the rail line linking Bryansk and Gomel; and 10,000 partisans were in operation against the rail line linking Minsk and Gomel.

Other important targets behind Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' were the seven temporary bridges over the Desna river to the south of Bryansk, which would be critical for any German retreat.

In overall terms, from the summer of 1943 Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' faced the depredations of more than 57,500 partisans in its Korück. The overall evaluation of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' was that it faced 62,000 partisans in identified units and 40,000 more in unidentified units within a total of 102,000 active partisans in its rear areas. The Germans considered partisans to have 60% less combat capability than front-line units, but to their direct combat capability the partisans could add their higher degree of tactical and operation mobility, and this meant that the partisans were rightly considered a very serious threat. In addition to their attacks on the Germans' core lines of communication, the partisans also cut telephone wires, blocked roads, laid minefields and deposited booby traps.

As the partisan offensive continued, more army and NKVD officers were dropped into partisan areas to co-ordinate activities and raise new units. In 1943 many partisan brigade commanders were replaced by regular army officers. During the winter of 1943/44 commanders with notably aggressive capabilities were promoted as the number of partisans grew to a total of more than 135,000 in the Korück of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' and the areas extending back as far as Brest-Litovsk and Minsk.

This winter growth in numbers paved the way to a new tactic as the partisan brigades focused on linking partisan areas: by 1 March most of these areas had been linked, leaving as the only areas under German control the supply corridors and main population centres; there were German outposts in partisan-controlled areas, but these were in effect isolated islands in a partisan sea.

The German command considered this partisan consolidation to be a serious threat, especially as by 1944 the partisan brigades had well developed command and control system and were altogether superior in capability to the partisan units of 1942/43. German reports from the Polotsk security forces described the partisan forces as being almost equal in capability to Soviet front-line infantry formations. Of special concern to Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' were the areas behind Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici’s (from 4 June General Kurt von Tippelskirch’s) 4^th Army and General Josef Harpe’s (from 9 June Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model’s) 9^th Army, in the vicinity of Borisov, Minsk and Bobruysk, where the terrain favoured partisan activity. The Germans undertook large numbers of offensive sweeps through such areas, but the partisans merely melted away into their unassailable forest and swamp base areas as the sweeps approached and then re-emerged to reassert their control after the Germans had departed.

In an effort to swell the numbers of men available for their anti-partisan operations, the Germans impressed more than 53,000 Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians into their security formations in the winter 1943/44. In April 1944 the Oberkommando des Heeres opened a school in Latvia to teach anti-partisan warfare for military and civilian agencies in the occupied western USSR.

The Soviet partisan plan for the support of 'Bagration' was to form fortified partisan regions whose presence would channel into known corridors the expected German withdrawal. The partisan brigades directly behind the German front fortified their positions in a process facilitated by the extensive forests and the Pripyet Marshes: this would compress any German withdrawal into four corridors (Polotsk/Minsk, Orsha/Minsk, Bobruysk/Brest-Litovsk and Mozyr/Brest-Litovsk).

The area behind Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' was quiet in April and May 1944, the partisans making few attacks and using the period to concentrate their efforts on reconnaissance and recruitment. Such attacks as there were on the Korück of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' were small and aimed generally at targets outside the main corridors. However, between January and March the partisans made more than 3,500 attacks on the Germans' transportation network. German maps of the period indicated three additional road descriptions reflecting the impact of the partisans on them: 1 indicated that the road was safe for single vehicles, 2 that it was safe for convoys, and 3 that it was unsafe for all travel.

The partisans devoted the rest of spring to the fortification of areas, the establishment of strategic defences behind the German front, the development of tactical training, and the gathering of intelligence on the German dispositions.

At this time the German security forces were severely below strength. The partisans generally responded to German security operations in battalion or regimental strength by melting away and refusing combat. Only when the Germans attacked a major base did the partisans defend from entrenched positions. In general, though, the German lack of manpower precluded the launching of many large-scale attacks.

As the ground dried after the thaw of the winter snow and the rain of spring, the Germans started to focus their plans on the Korück behind the 4^th Army and 3^rd Panzerarmee in the area to the south of Polotsk and to the west of Orsha and Vitebsk, in which more than 40,000 partisans were identified as active. This paved the way to the related 'Regenschauer', 'Frühlingsfest' and 'Kormoran' undertakings. 'Regenschauer' was posited on the fact that while the availability and flow of German supplies were severely strained, the rear areas were of such vital concern that they had to be cleared of the most imminent threat. It was estimated that 18,000 partisans were active in the Ushachi area just to the south of Polotsk. On 11 April more than 20,000 men of the 3^rd Panzerarmee attacked to the west in order to clear the area. The partisan brigades, which in fact totalled 26,000 men and women, immediately withdrew in the belief that this was merely the next of a series of sweeps, and that the Germans would subsequently withdraw. However, the Germans cleared the railway linking Lepel and Orsha railroad, and then dug in.

'Frühlingsfest' began immediately after 'Regenschauer' as elements of General Christian Hansen’s 16^th Army within Generaloberst Georg Lindemann’s Heeresgruppe 'Nord' attacked from south and west of Polotsk. They drove toward the entrenched positions of the 3^rd Panzerarmee near Lepel and caught the partisan brigades in a trap. The partisans fought back with determination, and the Soviet air force flew close support and large-scale resupply missions, and also airlifted men of front-line forces into the area.

The German forces committed to this undertaking including substantial numbers of Junkers Ju 87 dive-bomber and other attack aircraft, as well as numerous police and SS units. The partisan resistance was so fierce that their lines were broken only after the Germans had committed Generalmajor Herbert Michaelis’s 95^th Division of the 3^rd Panzerarmee. Although many of them escaped, the partisans lost 14,000 killed, captured or wounded, and another 11,000 persons had been deported for slave labour. More than 3,000 of the survivors moved into regions to the south of Orsha, and by the end of 'Frühlingsfest' the area to the south of Polotsk was free of partisan brigades and heavily garrisoned by German security and front-line forces including a combined force of Sicherheitsdienst personnel, police and SS troops of the Kampfgruppe 'von Gottberg' under the command of SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei Curt von Gottberg.

On 22 May security forces from 'Frühlingsfest' and additional police and SS forces from the railway linking Vilnyus, Minsk and Orsha attacked the remaining 14,000 partisans in the area in a concentric attack known as 'Kormoran'. The partisan brigades were not as well co-ordinated as they had been in earlier battles, and did not resist effectively.

By 22 June the Oberkommando des Heeres considered the area cleared and reported more than 13,000 partisan casualties. While the German forces in the area of Polotsk and Orsha area fought more than 40,000 partisans in these three offensives, the other 90,000 partisans increased all forms of attack and harassment in the Korück of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte'. They ceased to pull back in the face of German sweeps except in cases where the Germans had a numerical superiority. The partisans destroyed German strongpoints and often delivered attacks with the aid of heavy weapons. Air resupply was increased, and additional Soviet troops were flown into the now-numerous partisan airfields.

In June the Soviet air force flew a substantially larger number of support and combat sorties while at the same time increasing the rate at which supplies and troops were flown into partisan areas.

By this time the Soviets were on the eve of unleashing 'Bagration' on the Germans, and during the night of the 19/20 June the partisans in the Korück of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' began an all-out offensive on the main German lines of communication. That night they detonated more than 10,000 demolition charges on railway lines, followed by 892 on the following night. This was accompanied by heavy attacks on German security garrisons. These attacks almost completely paralysed for several days the railway lines linking Minsk and Orsha, and Mogilev and Vitebsk.

This relsovaya voina (war of the railway tracks) had been ordered by the Belorussian communist party in a radio signal of 8 June to all partisan. Throughout the short summer night of 19/20 June more than 10,000 demolition charges sundered German railway links to the west of Minsk. During the following night, and for three successive nights, the partisans continued their efforts against the tracks, sidings and junctions, laying and detonating some 40,000 demolition charges which spread the destruction as possible. The lines between Vitebsk and Orsha, and between Polotsk and Molodechno, suffered heavy damage, and the partisans visited still greater destruction on the lines connecting Minsk with Brest and Pinsk, the routes German reinforcements to the east would almost certainly take.

The start of 'Bagration' proper on 22/23 was then greatly aided by the 100,000 or members of the partisan brigades. As the Soviet armies moved through their areas of operation, the partisans were absorbed into the army as replacements.