'Hooker' was the British amphibious landing at Pizzo on the 'instep' of the Italian 'foot' and capture of Bagnara by Brigadier R. E. Urquhart’s 231^st Brigade (8/9 September 1943).

It was on 6 September that Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey’s XIII Corps of General Sir Bernard Montgomery’s 8^th Army made the decision that the 231^st Brigade, reinforced by No. 3 Commando and No. 40 (Royal Marine) Commando of Brigadier T. D. L. Churchill’s 2^nd Special Service Brigade, would land near Pizzo two days later, hold a bridgehead at Porto San Venere, and from there attempt to cut off the German forces pulling back ahead of Major General G. C. Bucknall’s 5^th Division by blocking Highway 18, the coastal route along the northern side of the 'foot' of Calabria. Naval support for the operation was to be provided in the form of the monitor Erebus and gunboats Aphis and Scarab, while air support was the responsibility of Air Vice Marshal H. Broadhurst’s Desert Air Force, which provided 90 Curtiss Kittyhawk fighter-bombers of the RAF for ground attack, 70 more Kittyhawk warplanes of the USAAF for strafing and sweeping, and 250 Supermarine Spitfire fighters for continuous patrols over the beach-head. Tactical reconnaissance was entrusted to No. 225 Squadron of the RAF in succession to No. 40 Squadron of the South African Air Force.

The time available for the preparation of 'Hooker' was notably short as the assault convoy sailed from Messina in north-eastern Sicily at 18.30 on 7 September. The shortage of time meant that it had not been feasible to arrange navigation aids to ease the task of finding the designated beaches, so it was hoped that the relevant navigational 'fixes' would be obtained while the convoy passed along the coast to the north of Cape Vaticano, and so make it possible for the crew to locate the breakwater at Porto San Venere, close to Pizzo. But this point was passed at night, and it was impossible to discern the breakwater.

As a result, on 8 September the leading troops landed in the wrong places and in the wrong tactical order. There was fortunately no one but a few coast-watchers to oppose them. The troops were sorted out and the battalions were just gaining their final positions when at 08.15 Oberst Horst von Usedom’s Kampfgruppe 'von Usedom' of Generalmajor Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz’s 26^th Panzerdivision began to arrive, led by the 3/4^th Fallschirmjägerregiment. At 09.40 eight German dive-bombers attacked the landing craft off shore, and 40 minutes later the whole of the Kampfgruppe 'von Usedom' had entered the fray. At about 11.30 the 3/71^st Panzergrenadierregiment also became involved, but failed to make any impression on the made no impression on the 1/Dorsetshire Regiment, and then disappeared along a side-road and took no further part in the engagement. The Kampfgruppe 'von Usedom' made a determined attack in the course of the afternoon on the 1/Hampshire Regiment holding the northern part of the British position. There followed a hard fight, much of it at close quarters. But the German paratroopers could not dislodge the British infantrymen, and toward dusk the entire German force pulled back to the north.

The Desert Air Force intervened on several occasions, and had the greater share in destroying 11 German guns and nine vehicles.

The casualties of the 231^st Brigade amounted to about 200 men, and three landing craft and one motor torpedo boat were sunk or damaged.

The 20^th Beach Group now took over the beach-head and developed the little harbour of Porto San Venere as a forward supply area as the 5^th Division, led by the 231^st Brigade, advanced on Nicastro on 9/10 September without meeting any opposition.

On 9 September Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark’s US 5^th Army effected its 'Avalanche' assault at Salerno farther to the north on Italy’s western coast.