'Independence' (i) was a French offensive by two corps toward Belfort and Mulhouse in eastern France (14 November/15 December 1944).

The undertaking pitted Général de Corps d’Armée Marie Emil Antoine Béthouart’s I Corps d’Armée and Général de Corps d’Armée Joseph Jean Goislard de Monsabert’s II Corps d’Armée of Général d’Armée Jean de Lattre de Tassigny’s 1ère Armée within General Jacob L. Devers’s Allied 6^th Army Group against General Friedrich Wiese’s 19^th Army within Generaloberst Hermann Balck’s Heeresgruppe 'G'.

On 17 October 1944, after a two-week drive that took Général de Division Augustin Léon Guillaume’s 3ème Division d’Infanterie Algérienne up the Moselotte river as far as Cornimont, de Lattre de Tassigny decided to revise his overall plan and launch a surprise offensive through the Belfort gap, a plateau located between the northern rim of the Jura mountains and the southern part of the Vosges mountains. The gap marks the divide between the drainage basins of the Rhine river in the east and that of the Rhône (Doubs and Saône) in the west.

Within this concept it remained vital that the II Corps should not lessen its pressure and so allow the Germans to redeploy their forces to face the new angle of French offensive. The offensive forged ahead, and on 5 November the 3ème Division d’Infanterie Algérienne reached the outskirts of the Col d’Oderen, more than 3,000 ft (915 m) high. Here the Germans had as many as 15 infantry battalions as well as Generalleutnant Georg Radziej’s 169^th Division, which had previously served in Finland but had been refitted since its return via Norway.

The redeployment of the French forces for the revised offensive was combined with a deception plan designed, in de Lattre de Tassigny’s words, 'to give the enemy the impression of total security in Vosges sector. Feint troop movements and the setting up of fictitious headquarters were made conspicuous in the area of Remiremont. At Plombières a detachment of [Général de Division Henri Jacques Jean François de Vernejoul’s] 5ème Division Blindée set up road signs, signposted routes and made full use of radio. All this activity drew the attention of [German] agents and if by chance it escaped them the intelligence agents were there to open their eyes to what was going on.' All that these feints suggested were corroborated in the mind of Wiese by bogus orders and letters, signed by de Lattre de Tassigny, which reached him from 'reliable' sources. The most effective of these 'documents' was the General Directive No. 4, in which de Lattre de Tassigny announced his intention of simulating troop movements and concentrations in the region of the Doubs to persuade the Germans to pull troops out of the Vosges.

de Lattre de Tassigny decided on his plan during 24 October: the I Corps was allocated the task of capturing the roads out of the Belfort gap to the east and at the same time storming this fortress town. If this primary task was achieved successfully, the II Corps would join the battle with the task of reaching the Rhine river between Huningue and Neuf-Brisach, and also the line linking Neuf-Brisach and Ribeauville via Colmar.

Devers, who intended to push Lieutenant Alexander McC. Patch’s US 7^th Army, the other component of his 6^th Army Group, forward from Saverne to Strasbourg, fully approved de Lattre de Tassigny’s plan and allocated him a battalion each of 8-in (203-mm) guns and 9.45-in (240-mm) howitzers as well as other heavy weapons units.

Béthouart’s first-line formations comprised Général de Division Joseph Abraham Auguste Pierre Edouard Magnan’s 9ème Division d’Infanterie Coloniale which, reinforced by a combat command of Général de Division Jean Louis Alain Touzet du Vigier’s 1ère Division Blindée, was to attack between the Swiss frontier and the Doubs (it should be remarked that Magnan’s Senegalese troops were relieved by Zouaves and Moroccan light infantry, and French resistance forces recruited in the area); and the 2ème Division Marocaine de Montagne, which had Montbéliard, Héricourt and Belfort as its objectives. The main weight of the operation would fall on this latter division, so it was given two combat commands from Général de Division Henri Jacques Jean François de Vernejoul’s 5^th Division Blindée.

On the German side, General Friedrich-August Schack’s LXXXV Corps was deployed on a 31-mile (50-km) front with Generalleutnant Hans Oschmann’s (from 14 November Generalmajor Rudolf von Oppen’s) 338^th Division on the left with its back to the Swiss frontier, and Generalmajor Wilhelm Dernen’s 159^th Division on the right barring the route toward Belfort. These were divisions with low-grade infantry units, composed mainly of heterogeneous elements and of differing morale (there was even one battalion of deaf men). However, the two divisions' fronts were covered by deep, dense anti-tank minefields whose clearance proved to be particularly hazardous, as they were protected by a formidable array of anti-personnel devices and explosive traps. Requisitioned workers from Delle district of Belfort were also being driven to complete the main construction of a 12.5-mile (20-km) anti-tank ditch.

This would have constituted a formidable obstacle to the 1^st Army if de Lattre de Tassigny had deferred the date of his offensive, giving the Germans the time to lay mines and man its defensive positions.

'Independence' (i) started on 14 November in sleet, and the advance through the German minefields caused heavy losses. The I Corps secured a foothold in the German positions but was unable to secure any breakthrough. Two factors favoured the French, however: Oschmann of the 338^th Division was killed by a patrol from the 2ème Division Marocaine de Montagne near the road linking Besançon and Montbéliard, and his aide-de-camp’s briefcase yielded a plan of the division’s positions as well as copies of several orders; and for 48 hours, the 19^th Army headquarters minimised the major nature of the French offensive.

On 16 November Heeresgruppe 'G' instructed the 19^th Army to withdraw to positions between Belfort and Delle, but its LXXXV Corps was by now so weak that its rearguard was overtaken and severely mauled by the French. The main action took place on the following day. During the evening of 17 November Colonel Guy Schlesser’s 4ème Combat Command managed to conceal its forward movement from the Germans, took the bridges over the Luzine river at Montbéliard by surprise, and opened the way for the 2ème Division Marocaine de Montagne. Near the Swiss frontier, the 9ème Division d’Infanterie Coloniale broke through the ineffective defence of the 338^th Division, enabling Béthouart to unleash du Vigier’s 1ère Division Blindée.

This gave de Latte de Tassigny the opportunity for which he had been waiting, and during the same evening he issued a general order to exploit the situation to the full: the commander of the 1ère Armée ordered the I Corps d’Armée to direct its 1ère Division Blindé toward the Rhine river, to use the 2ème Division Marocaine de Montagne to reduce the fortress of Belfort and to reincorporate the 5ème Division Blindée with a view to attacking Cernay (at a later stage he planned to direct it on Colmar and Neuf-Brisach, while the 1ère Division Blindée moved toward Sélestat and Strasbourg); at the same time he ordered the II Corps d’Armée to drive its right forward to Colmar via Giromagny and its left to storm the Col de Bussang and the Col de la Schlucht.

On 18 November the 2ème Division Marocaine de Montagne, co-operating with Général de Brigade Diégo Charles Joseph Brosset’s 1ère Division, made contact with the defences of Belfort. The 1ère Division Blindée, almost up against the Swiss frontier, crossed the anti-tank ditch mentioned above with barely no loss of momentum, and found the bridge over the Allaine river at Delle still intact thanks to the endeavours of the local French resistance forces. The division then took the little town and later in the evening of the same day destroyed an anti-aircraft unit. The 1^st Division Blindé had covered more than 18 miles (29 km) in the day.

On the next day the division covered more than 25 miles (40 km). Colonel Caldairou’s 3ème Combat Command led the column, and during its race to the Rhine it encountered only scant resistance and at 17.00, after crossing the Ill river, it passed through Jettingen, a mere 8 miles (13 km) from its objective. The division raced on, and at 18.30 on 19 November became the first Allied unit to reach the western bank of the Rhine river.

To the south of Belfort, however, the Germans had been driven back on one flank near Morvillars, but were still maintaining a stubborn defence against the attacks of the 9ème Division d’Infanterie Coloniale. At the same time the roads between Montbéliard and Morvillars, and Montbéliard and Fesche l’Eglise was so crowded with vehicles that it proved impossible to clear it for the 5ème Division Blindée in time for its new assignment as ordered on 17 November. Nevertheless, on 20 November the 3ème Combat Command took Mulhouse, and just missed capturing Wiese. In its wake, Colonel Adrien Pierre Raymond Gruss’s 1ère Combat Command struck at Altkirch from Seppois le Haut. Finally, on the same day, the fortress town of Belfort was completely invested.

At the headquarters of Heeresgruppe 'G', Balck was in a quandary: on the one hand he was under orders from Adolf Hitler to counterattack the 1^st Army, cutting off those of its formations which had reached the Rhine, and on the other hand the 7^th Army’s offensive in the Saverne sector was likely at any moment to sever the lines of communications for his 19^th Army and General Otto von Knobelsdorff’s (from 30 November General Hans von Obstfelder’s) 1^st Army. On 20 November, Balck suggested to Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, the Oberbefehlshaber 'West', that the German 1^st Army should be reinforced preparation for a counter-offensive, allowing the 19^th Army to be withdrawn to the north of Mulhouse. As usual, Hitler would not be swayed and Balck had no alternative but to set about the task of attempting to make an impossible plan work.

Generalmajor Otto Schiel’s 198^th Division was withdrawn from the sector between St Dié and Gérardmer and pulled back over the Schlucht river to Dannemarie, from which it launched a counterattack toward the Swiss frontier on 21 November. At its point of departure it was reinforced with Oberst Dr Franz Bäke’s 106^th Panzerbrigade 'Feldherrnhalle', equipped with modern Jagdpanther heavy tank destroyers and obsolete PzKpfw IV battle tanks. On its left it was supported by SS-Standartenführer Hans Siegling’s 30^th SS Waffen-Grenadierdivision (russische Nr 2).

Very heavy rain prevented the French from detecting the troop movements behind the German lines as the 198^th Division took up position. Furthermore, de Lattre de Tassigny had not received the 5^th Division Blindée in accordance with the schedule included in his order of 17 November. Thus the 198^th Division managed to break though the weak link in the French line to the south of Dannemarie and cut the road, linking Delle and Seppois, which was the route used to supply the 1ère Division Blindée. However, on 22 November the 198^th Division was itself outflanked by the 5ère Division Blindée and 9ème Division dmInfanterie Coloniale, and then subjected to a huge battery by the Allied artillery. Two days later, at the cost of furious effort and appreciable losses, Béthouartms corps cut the 198^th Division in two along the line of the road linking Delle and Seppois, and the 1ère Division Blindée’s line of communication was restored. The greater part of the 308^th Grenadierregiment and 326^th Grenadierregiment fought with their backs to the Swiss frontier, and the ordeal of the two regiments ended only late in the afternoon of 24 November.

The issue here was still undecided when on 22 November de Lattre de Tassigny ordered the II Corps to move off in a manoeuvre that elevated the whole battle from the tactical to the strategic level. On the same day the 2^nd Division Marocaine de Montagne won a fierce struggle to capture the fortress and village of Giromagny, and on 25 November the division had taken the fortress of Belfort. This made it possible to surround the 19^th Army in a pincer movement, with the II Corps d’Armée from Belfort moving to join the I Corps d’Armée attacking westward and south-westward from the line between Mulhouse and Altkirch. Meanwhile de Lattre de Tassigny was compelled to release the 1ème Division, which was under orders to move to western France for the task of clearing the area round the estuary of the Gironde river of its surviving German garrisons, and also found his remaining formations becoming short of ammunition. Hence Goislard de Monsabert’s III Corps d’Armée found it difficult to force its way through and, on 28 November, link with Béthouart’s I Corps d’Armée.

The destruction of the pocket created in this manner round the 159^th Division, 198^th Division and 338^th Division brought the number of prisoners taken by the French in Independence (i) to more than 17,000. More than 10,000 German dead, 120 guns and 60 armoured fighting vehicles, the last including Jagdpanther tank destroyers, littered the battlefield. The 1ère Armée’s losses were 1,440 killed and missing, 4,500 wounded, and 1,694 evacuated with severe frostbite. Among the dead was Brosset, who had been killed in a Jeep accident on 20 November and was succeeded at the head of the 1ère Division by Général de Division Pierre François Marie Joseph Garbay.

So it was that at the beginning of December, for lack of two or three divisions, the 1ère Armée halted along the line linking the Huningue Canal, a point north of Mulhouse, Thann, St Amarin and the Col de la Schlucht.

On the 6^th Army Group’s left, after an equally promising beginning the US 7^th Army experienced similar frustration for similar reasons. Devers had allocated the 7^th Army the task of liberating the plain of Alsace between, and including, Strasbourg and Wissembourg, and of throwing the German forces back across the Rhine river.

By 31 October Général de Division Philippe François Marie Jacques Leclerc de Hauteclocque’s 2ème Division Blindée had taken the initiative of forcing the Meurthe and pushing beyond Baccarat, so that by the offensive’s formal launch, on November 13, the US XIII Corps responsible for the main action occupied a line in front of Badonviller, Blâmont and Réchicourt. Opposing it, Oberst Wilhelm Bleckwenn’s 708^th Volksgrenadierdivision and Generalmajor Hans Bruhn’s (from 22 November Oberst Erich Löhr’s) 553^rd Volksgrenadierdivision, on the left flank of the 1^st Army, stood across the Saverne gap.

Major General Wade H. Haislip, commanding the XV Corps, had Brigadier General LeRoy H. Watson’s 79^th Division and Major General Robert L. Spragins’s 44^th Division in the front line, with the 2ème Division Blindée waiting to exploit the breakthrough, which came on 16 November. Leclerc had been preparing his plan on a large map, and on 10 November called in Colonel de Langlade, commanding one of his division’s three combat commands, to tell him that he must push his combat command into Alsace as rapidly as possible to take the German defences completely by surprise, not by means of the obvious route via Sarrebourg and Saverne, but by a series of minor roads from Cirey sur Vezouse, crossing the Blanche Sarre and Rouge Sarre rivers before reaching the Rethel crossroads, 6 miles (9.5 km) to the south-east of Sarrebourg, deep in the southern spurs of the Vosges mountains, before striking out along the road beside the Dabo river to Wasselonne or Marmoutier in the Alsatian plain. This was an extraordinarily bold scheme, echoing the German advance through the Ardennes in 'Sichelschnitt', for it envisaged a high-speed transit of narrow, steep and twisty roads through forested and ravined mountain terrain with M4 Sherman medium tanks.

At Cirey sur Vezouse Leclerc split his force into two parts. On the right, Combat Command L (incorporating Lieutenant Colonel Jacques de Guillebon’s Combat Command W) set off on the itinerary assigned to it on 19 November 19, and Combat Command L emerged onto the Alsatian plain in torrential rain at 09.30 on 21 November 21, followed closely by Combat Command W, which had reached and liberated Marmoutier, on the road linking Saverne and Strasbourg, by the end of the day. On the left, overtaking the 44^th Division, Colonel Louis Dio’s Combat Command D had the task of driving forward on Sarrebourg, Phalsbourg and Saverne north of Route Nationale 4. During this progress Combat command D crossed the Marne-Rhine Canal at Xouaxange by means of a bridge which was still standing as a result of the efforts of a lock-keeper, who had plied with drink the German engineers tasked with the bridge’s demolition.

Major Quiliquini’s force was stopped at Phalsbourg, but its frontal assault on the 553^rd Volksgrenadierdivision made it possible for Colonel Rouvillois’s force to outflank the Germans, finding a way round by La Petite Pierre. On the way, it attacked another German division, and during the evening of 21 November it too had reached the Alsatian plain to the north-east of Saverne.

Early in the afternoon of 22 November Combat Command L took Saverne from the rear, and in the process captured 800 Germans including Bruhn, commander of the 553^rd Volksgrenadierdivision. A few hours later, coming at the strong but west-facing defences of Phalsbourg from the east, the right-hand column of Combat Command L re-established communication between the 2^nd Armoured Division and the XV Corps along the road between Saverne and Sarrebourg road. The way to Strasbourg was open.

It was at 06.45 on 23 November that the manoeuvre to take Strasbourg began. This was undertaken along four axes, two taken by de Guillebon’s command and the other two by de Langlade’s command, and the final objective was Kehl. Just three hours later, three of the four French columns reached Strasbourg’s outlying forts, which were connected by an anti-tank ditch. The fourth column, which was the subsidiary group commanded by Rouvillois, had taken the route via Hochfelden, Brumath and Schiltigheim, surprised the defence by emerging from this unexpected direction, and at 10.10 hours sent the prearranged coded message reporting its arrival in Strasbourg. It was soon followed by the remainder of Combat Command L and all of Combat Command W, but was unable to prevent the destruction of the Kehl bridge. The German resistance was overcome during the afternoon, and at 18.00 the French flag was raised at the top of Strasbourg cathedral’s spire.

During the afternoon of 25 November, Generalleutnant Franz Vaterrodt, commanding the garrison, and his second-in-command, Generalmajor Uttersprungen, who had sought refuge in Fort Ney, surrendered to a detachment of the 2^nd Armoured Division.

Meanwhile the problems and other difficulties which had dogged the 7^th Army, the 6^th Army Group’s other major component, had continued. After cutting through the front formed by the 1^st Army and 19^th Army, Patch committed his VI and XV Corps in an advance toward the German frontier in accordance with his orders to provide support for Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s US 3^rd Army in its attack on the 'Westwall'. On the 7^th Army’s right the VI Corps, commanded by Major General Edward H. Brooks since the appointment of Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott to command the US 5^th Army in Italy, advanced Major General Ira T. Wyche’s 79^th Division to Lauterbourg by 6 December, while its 45^th Division was attacking the 'Siegfried-Linie' defences parallel to Bergzabern, both of these divisions fighting their way into the German defensive system.

On the 7^th Army’s left, the XV Corps was pounding the German fortifications in the area of Bitche, the only section of the Maginot Line to play a role in 1944. The XV Corps had reduced these defences when the start of the 'Wacht am Rhein' offensive in the Ardennes placed other imperatives on it. At Strasbourg, Major General John W. O’Daniel’s 3^rd Division of the VI Corps had relieved the 2^nd Armoured Division which, in company with Major General John E. Dahlquist’s 36^th Division and Major General Charles C. Hoffner’s 103^rd Division, tried to prevent the Germans from creating new defensive positions round Colmar.

Here Patch hoped to achieve two things at the same time: effect a breakthrough in the 'Westwall' defences between the Rhine river and the Saar river, and clear the Germans from the left bank of the Rhine river above Strasbourg. This double tasking had been given to him by Devers who, in calling for two divergent operations, was doing no more than conform to instructions he had received from the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. On 2 December, however, the headquarters of the 6^th Army Group switched responsibility for the Colmar undertaking from the 7^th Army to the 1ère Armée, at the same time allocating it the 36^th Division and 2^nd Armoured Division. This represented a local change of overall command rather than a reinforcement, and at a time when his army’s capabilities had been reduced by the removal of the 1ère Division, de Lattre de Tassigny was now expecting to lose his 1ère Division Blindée, which was to be sent to Royan to aid the 1ère Division.

The 6^th Army Group was not concerned, however, for while it recognised the stiffening of German resistance in Alsace, it attributed this to a desire by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht not to pull its formations back from the western bank of the Rhine river until it had had ample time to provide for the defence of this great waterway’s eastern bank. This perception was wholly erroneous.

In the middle of the campaign’s first portion, Hitler had dismissed Balck and dissolved Heeresgruppe 'G', which was replaced by the Oberkommando 'Oberrhein' under the command of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. Hitler was adamant that the Colmar lodgement should be held, and ordered the strengthening of its defences.

de Lattre de Tassigny now incorporated the two divisions he had been allotted, as well as the 3ème Division d’Infanterie Algérienne, his Moroccan troops and the 4ème Combat Command of the 5ème Division Blindée into the II Corps d’Armée, which was ordered to attack the north-western front of the pocket along the line linking the Col du Bonhomme, Ribeauville, Sélestat and Rhinau. The I Corps d’Armée was at the same time instructed to attack along the line between Mulhouse and Thann. Both corps were given Neuf-Brisach as their objective.

But the men of the 1ère Armée were exhausted and the weather was vile, and as a result the I Corps d’Armée and II Corps d’Armée hammered at the German defence but failed to break it. The II Corps d’Armée managed better than the I Corps, taking Orbey and Kayserberg, in the process capturing 5,568 prisoners, but its own losses were heavy and on 19 December the II Corps d’Armée was ordered to halt offensive operations and take up a defensive position along the line it had reached.