The 'Medvezhyegorsk Offensive Operation' was a minor Soviet offensive by elements of General Leytenant Valerian A. Frolov’s Karelia Front in Finland against elements of Kenraaliluutnantti Axel Erik Heinrichs’s Karjalan Armeija (Army of Karelia) (3/10 January 1942).

At the end of December 1941, the Soviet supreme command instructed Frolov’s Karelia Front to prepare an operation to defeat the Finnish forces in the Medvezhyegorsk (Karhumäki in Finnish) area of Karelia in order to remove the threat these forces posed to the Kirov railway extending along the western coast of the White Sea and linking Murmansk and the Leningrad area. Little time was allocated for the preparation of the operation, no significant reinforcements were provided for its implementation, and there was an acute shortage of ammunition. On sector of the planned offensive, the Finnish forces had an overall superiority in men and weapons, and Heinrichs had the additional advantage of possessing considerable experience in the type of operation fought in forested terrain.

For the forthcoming offensive, the Karelia Front possessed General Major Georgi A. Veschezersky’s Maselga Operational Group (186^th Division, 289^th Division, 367^th Division, 61^st Naval Brigade and 65^th Marine Brigade) and General Major Sergei G. Trofimenko’s Medvezhyegorsk Operational Group (71^st Division, 313^rd Division and eight-battalion 1^st Ski Brigade).

On 3 January, after a short artillery preparation, units of the Maselga Operational Group launched the offensive, and units of the Medvezhyegorsk Operational Group began a reconnaissance in force . The Finnish command reacted with considerable speed, swiftly bringing forward reserves and launching strong counterattacks. The Soviet offensive was greatly diminished in effect by its use of stereotyped tactics already well known to the Finns: these comprised frequent but poorly prepared attacks on the same axes. The Finns were able to undertake a successful defence using their network of pre-prepared key positions, well-concealed troop movements and descents on the Soviet flanks. As a result, the Soviet forces suffered significant losses.

Fierce and stubborn fighting continued until 10 January, and in this time the Soviet troops advanced between 1.25 and 3.1 miles (2 and 5 km) to the west, and despite their limited territorial gains did manage to improve their positions. With the approach their reserves, the Finns began to benefit from a still greater superiority of strength even as the Soviet forces' increasing shortage of ammunition made it impossible for them hope for further success. Under these circumstances, Frolov requested the Soviet supreme command to allow the termination of the offensive, and on 11 January he received such permission.

In overall terms, the Soviet offensive had not achieved its objective of routing the Finnish forces in the Medvezhyegorsk area, but had succeeded in pushing them back a short distance, which the Finns were able to construe as a Finnish success. Early in the following month, Finnish forces attempted to regain their lost positions, in the process managing to encircle and almost completely destroy one Soviet infantry regiment, but the Finnish counter-offensive was checked and brought to a halt by the 289^th Division and 367^th Division, and the Finns therefore failed to reach the line they had occupied on 3 January.

Nevertheless, the operation yielded a number of positive results for the Soviets: the Finns did not begin to withdraw troops from the Medvezhyegorsk sector to the Svir and Murmansk sectors; the Finnish forces in the Medvezhyegorsk area committed all available reserves and were thus unable to take offensive actions in the 1942 campaign; and the village of Velikaya Guba was liberated.