'Schill' (i) was a U-boat wolfpack operation in the Atlantic against the MKS.28, KMS.31, MKS.29A, MKS.30 and SL.139 convoys (25 October/9 November 1943).

The wolfpack comprised U-228, U-262, U-306, U-333, U-358, U-466, U-707 and the anti-aircraft boats U-211, U-441 and U-953, and for the loss of Kapitänleutnant Claus von Trotha’s U-306 and Oberleutnant Günter Gretschel’s U-707 sank one 2,968-ton ship.

This undertaking began as a one-night operation, with air reconnaissance support by Generalleutnant Ulrich Kessler’s Fliegerführer 'Atlantik' command, against the MRS.38 convoy. Supported by Commander H. V. King’s British 39^th Escort Group (sloops Rochester, Hastings and Scarborough, frigate Tavy, corvettes Azalea, Balsam and Geranium, attached destroyers Whitehall and Watchman, and auxiliary anti-aircraft ship Alynbank), this convoy was reported as departing Gibraltar on 23 October, and was located and reported by a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor long-range maritime reconnaissance bomber of the III/Kampfgeschwader 40 after joining the SL.138 convoy on 25 October.

Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, commander-in-chief of the German navy but still in day-to-day command of the U-boat arm via Konteradmiral Eberhard Godt, the service’s operations chief, established the 'Schill' (i) wolfpack across the anticipated route of the convoy during the night of 29/30 October. Fw 200 aircraft reported the convoy on 27 and 28 October as 56 ships with seven escorts, but on the decisive 29 October the four Condor aircraft deployed for last-minute reconnaissance passed to the north of the convoy without spotting it. Now comprising 60 ships, the convoy was then located and reported at about 12.00 on 30 October by a Blohm und Voss Bv 222 long-range flying boat of the 1 (Fern)./Seeaufklärungsgruppe 129.

Toward morning on 31 October the convoy passed the wolfpack’s patrol line. Kapitänleutnant Heinz Franke’s U-262 sank the 2,968-ton Norwegian Hallfried in a submerged attack, but U-333 missed an escort. U-306 was located by HF/DF and then sunk by the destroyer Whitehall and corvette Geranium. Because of the convoy’s strong air escort, the Germans then called off the attack and the remaining U-boats were ordered to establish a new patrol line. On 1 November U-953 sighted and reported an MKF convoy which was moving too quickly to be reached and attacked. German air reconnaissance on 2 November did not succeed in finding and reporting the expected KMS.31 convoy.

On 3 November U-333 sighted a landing ship convoy and missed an escorting destroyer. After unsuccessful air reconnaissances on 3, 4 and 5 November, an Fw 200 sighted the MKS.29A convoy, supported by the British Escort Group B4, on 7 November, but then lost contact and the convoy was not found again on 8 November. However, during the night of 8/9 November the convoy encountered the new patrol line: U-262 transmitted the first sighting report, U-466 missed a destroyer before being depth-charged and damaged, Gretschel’s U-707 was sunk by a Boeing Fortress long-range maritime patrol bomber of the RAF’s No. 220 Squadron from the Azores islands, and U-262 and U-228 missed a destroyer and a straggler respectively.

Although Fw 200 reconnaissance aircraft reported the convoy on another two occasions, U-211, U-333 and U-358 did not approach it.