The 'Sinking of Force Z' was an air/naval engagement between Japanese aircraft and British warships in the South China Sea off the eastern coast of the British colonies of Malaya and the Straits Settlements some 70 miles (110 km) to the east of Kuantan (10 December 1941).

In this British disaster, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle-cruiser Repulse were sunk by land-based bombers and torpedo bombers of the Imperial Japanese navy.

The objective of Force Z, which comprised one battleship, one battle-cruiser and four destroyers but lacked air cover, was to intercept the Malaya-bound Japanese invasion fleet in the South China Sea while it was still to the north of Malaya. Although the British had a close encounter with Japanese heavy surface units, they failed to find and destroy the main convoy. On their return to Singapore they were attacked in open waters and sunk by long-range torpedo bombers. The commander of Force Z, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, elected to maintain radio silence and an alert was not sent (by Repulse) until one hour after the first Japanese attack.

With the Japanese 'Ai' carrierborne air attack on Pearl Harbor only three days earlier, the Malayan engagement illustrated the effectiveness of air attacks against even the heaviest of naval assets if they were without air cover. This added to the importance for the Allies of the three US Navy aircraft carriers operational in the Pacific. The sinking of the two British capital ships severely weakened the Singapore-based British Eastern Fleet, now under the command of Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton in succession to Phillips, and the Japanese fleet was engaged only by submarines until the 'Battle off Endau' on 27 January 1942. Singapore itself fell to the Japanese just a month later on 15 February.

In meetings on 17 and 20 October 1941, the British Defence Committee formally discussed the reinforcement of the Far Eastern naval forces in response to the fall of Prince Fumimaro Konoe’s moderate government of Japan on 16 October. In accord with the assessments of August to September of Japanese intentions, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his cabinet favoured the deployment of a modern battleship for its supposed deterrent effect. As part of its offensive strategy, the Royal Navy planned to send the 'Nelson' class and 'Revenge' class battleships to Singapore, but the former could not deploy: Nelson had been damaged in the Mediterranean Sea late in September, and crew leave prevented her sistership Rodney from deploying until the middle of December, and a gun refit scheduled from February to May 1942 was required before she could conduct further operations. With working up, the earliest time either could reach the Far East was August 1942. The 'King George V' class battleship Prince of Wales was, aside from the 'Revenge' class ships, the only worked-up battleship that could sail east before the spring of 1942. On 20 October, the committee decided to send Prince of Wales to Cape Town in South Africa. Once the ship had reached Cape Town, a review would decide whether to send the ship onward to Singapore. This would keep Prince of Wales available to respond to an emergency in home waters.

In December 1941, as a deterrent to Japanese territorial expansion which had recently been demonstrated by the invasion of French Indo-China, it was proposed that a force of Royal Navy warships be sent to the Far East with a view to reinforcing the region’s Britain’s possessions most especially Singapore. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, represented that Singapore could be adequately defended only if the Royal Navy sent the majority of its capital ships there, in order to achieve parity with an estimated force of nine Japanese battleships. However, the despatch of so large a British force was impractical given that the UK was already at war with Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, Churchill appeared optimistic about the improving situation in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and thus argued for the despatch of two capital ships along with an aircraft carrier to defend Malaya, Borneo and the Straits Settlements.

Churchill has been criticised for showing 'considerable ignorance' and holding an 'exaggerated belief in the power of the battleship', along with 'a tendency to interfere in naval matters'. This may have led him to propose a squadron of three modern ships comprising one battleship, one battle-cruiser and one aircraft carrier. Churchill’s view was that use of 'Ultra' decrypts, revealing Japanese ship locations, would make it possible for the British to use their own ships to constitute a 'fleet in being' to deter Japanese action, as the German battleship Tirpitz, sister of the lost Bismarck, was doing in the North Sea. However, there was no firm plan for such a task. The revised British proposal allocated the new 'King George V' class battleship Prince of Wales, the veteran 'Renown' class battle-cruiser Repulse and the 'Illustrious' class aircraft carrier Indomitable for air cover, though the plan had to be revised when Indomitable ran aground in the Caribbean Sea. and became unavailable as she was repaired.

The despatch of capital ships to Singapore had been part of the Admiralty’s strategic planning since the naval base had been expanded and fortified from a time early in the 1920s. The scale of this planned deployment had been reduced during the 1930s, since Germany and Italy presented new threats to British interests in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Nevertheless, it was still assumed that a significant force of capital ships would deter Japanese expansion. Churchill’s plan presumed that the USA would agree to send Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s Pacific Fleet, including eight battleships, to Singapore in the event of hostilities with Japan, or that the British force would add to the deterrent value of the US fleet, should it remain at Pearl Harbor. The commander-in-chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Tovey, was opposed to sending any of the new 'King George V' battleships as he believed that they were not suited to operating in tropical waters. Indeed the humid climate of Malaya would negatively affect the capabilities of Prince of Wales, such as the breakdown of her surface search radars, deterioration of her anti-aircraft ammunition, and increased crew fatigue for lack of air conditioning.

Force G, comprising the modern battleship Prince of Wales, the World War I-era battle-cruiser Repulse and the destroyers Electra, Express, Encounter and Jupiter arrived at Singapore on 2 December, at which point Force G became Force Z.

As noted above, the new aircraft carrier Indomitable had been allocated to Force G, but while working up off Jamaica had run aground in the entrance to Kingston harbour on 3 November. The vessel required 12 days of dry dock repairs in Norfolk, Virginia, in the eastern USA and was therefore not able to take part in the action. Indomitable carried one squadron each of Fairey Fulmar single-engined two-seat fighters and Hawker Sea Hurricane single-engined single-seat fighters. Another aircraft carrier, Hermes, which was with Prince of Wales at Cape Town, was on passage to Singapore to join Force Z, but was not deployed as a result of her lack of speed.

On 1 December, it was announced that Phillips had been promoted to full admiral and appointed as commander-inc-chief of the Eastern Fleet. A few days later, Repulse left for Australia with the Australian destroyer Vampire and the British destroyer Tenedos, but the force was recalled to Singapore to assemble for possible operations against the Japanese.

Also at Singapore were the light cruisers Durban, Danae, Dragon and Mauritius, and the destroyers Stronghold, Encounter and Jupiter. The heavy cruiser Exeter, the Dutch light cruiser Java, two more British destroyers (Scout and Thanet), and four US destroyers (Whipple, John D. Edwards, Edsall and Alden) would be there within three days.

Although Durban and Stronghold were available, Phillips decided to leave them at Singapore as they were not as fast as the other units. Additionally, while Danae, Dragon, Mauritius, Encounter and Jupiter were also at Singapore, they were under repair and not ready to sail.

Churchill announced publicly that Prince of Wales and Repulse were being sent to Singapore in an effort to deter the Japanese. In response, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, sent 36 Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' twin-engined bombers to reinforce the existing Mitsubishi G3M 'Nell' twin-engined bombers of the Kanoya Air Group and Genzan Air Group, whose pilots began training for an attack on the two capital ships. The bomber crews of the [er]Kanoya Air Group (Kanoya Kaigun Kokutai), Genzan Air Group and Mihoro Air Group trained in torpedo attacks at an altitude of less than 33 ft (20 m), and in long-range over-ocean navigation so that they could attack naval targets moving quickly at sea. The Genzan Air Group was led by Lieutenant Commander Niichi Nakanishi, the Kanoya Air Group by Lieutenant Commander Shichizo Miyauchi and the Mihoro Air Group by Lieutenant Hachiro Shoji. This was the first time in the war that a force of bombers had been specifically trained and equipped for 'ship killing', an unprecedented capacity, as around that time ordinary land-based bombers (particularly the Mediterranean theatre) had attacked ships at sea with limited success.

Early in the morning of 8 December, bombers of Mihoro Air Group attacked Singapore. Prince of Wales and Repulse responded with anti-aircraft fire but shot down no aircraft, and the ships sustained no damage. The Japanese made their 'E' (ii) landings at Kota Bharu in northern-eastern Malaya, on 8 December as the first step in the Japanese invasion of Malaya.

News arrived that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and eight US battleships sunk or disabled. Pre-war planning had explored the possibility of the US Pacific Fleet sending major units to Singapore to reinforce the British when war broke out, but any such move was now impossible. Phillips had concluded in an earlier discussion with the two senior US commanders in the Philippine islands group, General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart that his two capital ships were insufficient to confront the Japanese. However, with the Japanese threatening to overrun Malaya, Phillips was pressed to use his ships in an offensive role, and assembled his force of six ships to try to intercept and destroy Japanese invasion convoys in the South China Sea.

Phillips did not believe that the RAF and other Allied air forces could guarantee cover for his ships as they had only limited numbers of fighters. However, the Royal Australian Air Force’s No. 453 Squadron with 10 Brewster F2A Buffalo single-engined fighters at RAF Sembawang, had been designated as the 'Fleet Defence Squadron', to provide close cover for Force Z. The squadron’s acting commander, Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors, had been advised of the radio procedures to be used by Force Z.

Despite his misgivings about the air cover available, Phillips elected to proceed. It is believed that four factors entered into his decision: he thought that Japanese warplanes could not operate so far from land; he believed that his ships were relatively immune from fatal damage from air attack' he was unaware of the quality of Japanese aircraft and torpedoes; and, like other many Royal Navy officers, he underestimated the fighting abilities of the Japanese. Up to that point, no capital ship had been sunk at sea by air attack. The Italian heavy cruiser Pola had been disabled by a torpedo from a Fleet Air Arm Fairey Swordfish single-engined aeroplane at the 'Battle of Cape Matapan' on 29 March 1941, and was later sunk by a torpedo from the destroyer Jervis. These and other Royal Navy operations in the Mediterranean theatre between September 1939 and December 1941 showed that it was risky but possible to operate in waters covered by an opponent’s land-based air power, as German and Italian aircraft damaged but could not stop Malta convoys, while no British battleships had been lost. Phillips grossly underestimated the scale of attack he now faced, and believed that the majority of Japanese attack aircraft would be level bombers rather than land-based naval torpedo bombers. However the p=crews of the Japanese bombers scheduled to attack his ships were specially trained and their aircraft equipped for 'ship killing', which the British did not realise as a result of intelligence failures.

Prince of Wales, Phillips’s flagship, possessed one of the most advanced naval anti-aircraft systems of the time, the High-Angle Control System, which had demonstrated accurate long-range radar-directed anti-aircraft fire during the 'Halberd' operation in August and September 1941. However, the extreme heat and humidity in Malayan waters rendered the ship’s anti-aircraft fire-control radars unserviceable and her 2-pdr ammunition had deteriorated. Royal Air Force technicians were summoned to examine Prince of Wales's radars, but needed a week to effect repairs, and Force Z would be under way in a just few days.

No. 453 Squadron was not kept informed of the ships' position and, as noted above, no radio request for air cover was sent until one hour after the Japanese attack had began. Vigors had proposed a plan to keep six aircraft over Force Z during daylight, but this was declined by Phillips. After the war, Vigors remained bitter toward Phillips him for his failure to call in a timely fashion for air support, and later commented that 'I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help.' Daytime air cover off the coast was also offered by Wing Commander Wilfred Clouston of the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s No. 488 Squadron, but this 'Mobile' scheme was also rejected.

After receiving word of a Japanese convoy bound for Malaya, Force Z departed Singapore at 17.10 on 8 December. Phillips hoped to attack the Japanese off Singora, in the Gulf of Siam off south-eastern Thailand, on 10 December and, had he departed one day sooner, might have achieved his objective without coming under air attack at all, for the Japanese squadrons had not yet arrived.

At 07.13 on 9 December, Force Z passed the Anambas islands group to the east, and turned to a new course of 330°, later changing to 345°. Force Z was overflown by two Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, but not reported, before being spotted by the Japanese submarine I-65 at 14.00 on 9 December, which shadowed the British ships for five hours, radioing their positions. Phillips was unaware he was being tracked. After this contact report, Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, in command of the invasion force, ordered most of his warships to escort the empty transports back to Cam Ranh Bay in southern Vietnam.

I-65's amplifying report, confirming the presence of British battleships, reached the headquarters of Rear Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga’s 22^nd Air Flotilla, an element of Vice Admiral Nishizo Tsukahara’s 11^th Air Force, two hours later. At that time, the flotilla’s three air groups were in the process of loading bombs onto the aircraft for an attack on Singapore harbour, but immediately switched to torpedoes. The bombers were not ready until 18.00. The report also prompted the Japanese [w]2^nd Fleet, Southern Force, Main Body, to sortie to the south from Indo-China to intercept Force Z. The fleet comprised the battleships Kongo and Haruna, three 'Takao' class heavy cruisers and eight destroyers, which were supplemented by four 'Mogami' class heavy cruisers of Cruiser Division 7 and one light cruiser and four destroyers of Destroyer Squadron 3. The heavy cruiser Chokai, Ozawa’s flagship, was also ordered to the south to find Force Z.

At about 17.30, just 30 minutes before sunset, Force Z was spotted by three Aichi E13A 'Jakje' single-engined reconnaissance floatplanes catapult-launched by the cruisers Yura, Kinu and Kumano, which were escorting the transports. The floatplanes continued to shadow the British ships. At about 18.30, Tenedos was detached to return to Singapore as she was running short of fuel, with instructions to contact Rear Admiral A. F. E. Palliser, detailed to act as liaison to the RAF in Malaya. Phillips’s intention was no longer to attack Singora, although he changed course at 19.00 toward Singora in order to deceive the shadowing floatplanes, then to the south toward Singapore at 20.15, when darkness covered him. Tenedos duly reported at 20.00, thereby preserving the secrecy of Phillips’s position.

A night air attack was attempted by the Japanese because they feared that the British would find the convoy, but bad weather prevented the discovery of the British ships, and the bombers therefore returned to their airfields at Thu Dau Mot and Saigon at about 00.00.

During the night, one of the Japanese floatplanes dropped a flare over the heavy cruiser Chokai after mistaking her for Prince of Wales. After this, the Japanese force of six cruisers and several destroyers turned away to the north-east. The flare was seen by the British force, whose commanders feared that Force Z had been identified and then turned away to the south-east. At this point, the forces were approximately 5 miles (8 km) apart, but did not sight each other, and the Japanese force was not picked up on the radar of Prince of Wales. At 20.55, Phillips cancelled the operation, saying that Force Z had lost the element of surprise, and ordered his sips to return to Singapore.

On the way back, they were spotted and reported by the Japanese submarine I-58 at 03.40. The submarine reported that she had fired five torpedoes and missed, and then lost sight of the force three hours later. The British force did not see the torpedoes, and never knew they had been attacked. The report from I-58 reached the headquarters of the 22^nd Air Flotilla at 03.15, and 10 bombers of the Genzan Air Group were despatched at 06.00 on a sector search for the ships. Many more aircraft, some armed with bombs and others with torpedoes, soon followed. The Genzan Air Group took off at 07.55, the Kanoya Air Group at 08.14, and the Mihoro Air Group at 08.20, and all the aircraft were ordered to proceed to the best-estimated position of the British ships.

At 00.50 on that same morning, Phillips had received a report from Palliser of Japanese landings at Kuantan, on the eastern coast of Malaya, halfway between Singapore and Kota Bharu; Phillips headed in that general direction, without signalling Palliser about his intentions as this radio signal would have revealed his position. Palliser failed to anticipate this change and therefore did not request air cover over Kuantan from the Sembawang-based Buffalo fighters. At 05.15, objects were spotted on the horizon and, in the belief that these were the ships of the invasion force, Force Z turned toward what was then discovered to be a trawler towing barges. At 06.30, Repulse reported seeing an aeroplane shadowing the ships. At 07.18, Prince of Wales catapult-launched a Supermarine Walrus single-engined reconnaissance flying boat, which flew to Kuantan, saw nothing, reported back to Prince of Wales, and flew to Singapore.

Express was sent to investigate the area, but found nothing. Phillips was unaware that a large force of Japanese land-based bombers was now searching for his ships but, not having anticipated his detour to Kuantan, was searching much farther to the south. At about 10.00 Tenedos, which had been detached from the main force on the previous day and was now about 140 miles (225 km) to the south-east of Force Z, began signalling that she was being attacked by Japanese aircraft. The attack was carried out by nine G3M medium bombers of the Saigon-based Genzan Air Group, each armed with one 1,102-lb (500-kg) armour-piercing bomb. The Japanese aircraft mistook the destroyer for a battleship and wasted their ordnance without scoring a hit. At 10.15, a scout aeroplane to the north of most of the Japanese aircraft spotted Force Z and sent out a message detailing its exact position.

The remaining Japanese aircraft converged upon the retreating British task force. They had spread out to search for the British warships, and therefore arrived over the target in small groups. With fuel running short, the Japanese attacked as they arrived rather than forming into a large force for a co-ordinated strike. The first wave of Japanese bombers, comprising eight G3M bombers of the Mihoro Air Group, attacked at 11.13, concentrating solely on Repulse. Besides seven near misses with 551-lb (250-kg) bombs, they scored just one hit, which penetrated the hangar and the upper deck and exploded in the marine mess area. The bomb caused no serious damage and relatively few casualties, and Repulse continued at 25 kt and with full combat capability. Five of the eight bombers were damaged by anti-aircraft fire, and two were forced to return to base.

At about 11.40, 17 G3M torpedo bombers (two squadrons of the Genzan Air Group) approached the two capital ships. Eight concentrated on Repulse and nine attacked Prince of Wales, sending eight torpedoes speeding toward the flagship, one aeroplane having aborted its run on Prince of Wales and peeled off to attack Repulse. One G3M was shot down and three more were damaged by Prince of Wales's anti-aircraft fire during this attack. This first wave of torpedo attackers scored no hits on Repulse, but did achieve one ultimately fatal hit on Prince of Wales, right where her outer port propeller shaft exited the hull. Turning at maximum revolutions, the shaft twisted and ruptured the glands that prevented sea water entering the ship via the broad shaft tunnel’s interior bulkheads. The flagship promptly took in 2,400 tons of water and her speed dropped to 16 kt.

The officer commanding 'B' engine room indicated that the shaft was stopped, but as it was restarted water rushed in through the damaged shaft passage, flooding 'B' engine room and forcing its evacuation. Also flooded as a result of this hit were the long shaft passage itself, 'Y' action machinery room, the port Diesel dynamo room, 'Y' boiler room, the central auxiliary machinery room, and a number of other compartments aft.

The torpedo hit had other devastating effects. First, it caused an 11.5° list to port, resulting in the starboard 5.25-in (133.4-mm) anti-aircraft turrets being unable to depress far enough to engage low-level attackers. Furthermore, power to the ship’s after 5.25-in (133.4-mm) dual-purpose turrets was cut, leaving her unable to effectively counter subsequent attacks. The loss of power to her pumps meant the ship could not pump out the inrushing water faster than it was flooding into the breached hull. The torpedo damage also denied Prince of Wales much of her auxiliary electrical power, vital for internal communications, ventilation, steering gear, and pumps, and for the training and elevation of the 5.25-in (133.4-mm) and 2-pdr gun mounts. All but S1 and S2 5.25-in (133.4-mm) turrets were effectively unmanageable, a factor compounded by the list, rendering their crews unable even to drag them around manually using chains. The crews also had difficulty bringing the heavy 2-pdr mountings into manual operation. The extensive internal flooding and shaft damage caused the shutting down of the inboard port propeller shaft, leaving the ship under the power of only the starboard engines and able to make no more than 15 kt. With her electric steering unresponsive, the ship was virtually unmanageable.

Another torpedo attack was carried out by 26 G4M bombers of the Kanoya Air Group at about 12.20, and Prince of Wales was hit by another three torpedoes on her starboard side: one impacted at the very bow, one opposite B main gun turret, and one abaft Y turret which not only punctured the hull but bent the outer starboard propeller shaft inboard and over the inner shaft, stopping it instantly.

At the same time as this last torpedo attack began against Prince of Wales, bombers of the Kanoya Air Group also attacked Repulse from both port and starboard. Repulse had dodged 19 torpedoes so far, but was caught in an anvil attack and hit on the port side by one torpedo. Within minutes, other attacks resulted in at least three more torpedoes hitting the ship. She had been hit seriously and Captain W. G. Tennant soon ordered the crew overboard, Repulse listed heavily to port over a period of about six minutes and then rolled over and sank stern first at 12.33 with heavy casualties.

Prince of Wales was now under power by only one propeller but was still able to fire at the high-level bombing attack which began at 12.41, although only with her S1 and S2 5.25-9n (133.4-mm) turrets. Although most of the bombs straddled the battleship, one penetrated her deck amidships and penetrated the upper deck to detonate among the wounded gathered in the cinema flat beneath, causing extensive casualties. Prince of Wales soon started to capsize to port, even though she had taken more torpedo hits to starboard, and Express came alongside to take off the wounded and non-fighting crew. The order to abandon ship was then given, and soon after this Prince of Wales rolled over to port, floated for a brief moment upside down, and then sank stern first at 13.18. As she rolled over, she scraped Express, lying close alongside taking off survivors, with her bilge keel, and very nearly took the destroyer down with her.

The Japanese had achieved eight torpedo hits, four each on Prince of Wales and Repulse, out of 49 torpedoes, while losing only three aircraft (one G3M torpedo bomber of the Genzan Air Group and two G4M torpedo bombers of the Kanoya Air Group) during the attack itself, and a fourth aeroplane was so badly damaged that it crashed on landing.

The air cover assigned to Force Z, namely 10 Buffalo fighters of No. 453 Squadron, arrived over the scene of the battle at 13.18, just as [er]Prince of Wales sank. The fighters encountered a scouting aeroplane flown by Ensign Masato Hoashi, who had earlier discovered Force Z, but it managed to escape the Buffalo fighters and returned to confirm the sinkings.

The destroyers Electra and Vampire moved in to rescue survivors of Repulse, while Express rescued those of Prince of Wales. Some 840 British sailors were lost, in form of 513 of Repulse and 327 of Prince Of Wales. After they had been rescued, some of Repulse's survivors manned action stations to free Electra's sailors to rescue more survivors. In particular, Repulse's gunners manned the X and Y 4.7-in (119.4-mm) mounts, and Repulse's dentist assisted Electra's medical teams with the wounded. In total nearly 1,000 survivors of Repulse were rescued, 571 of them by Electra. Vampire recovered nine officers, 213 ratings, and one civilian war correspondent from Repulse, and two sailors from Prince of Wales.

Of the senior officers on Prince of Wales, Phillips and Captain John Leach chose to go down with the ship. Captain William Tennant of Repulse was rescued by Vampire.

On the way back to Singapore with the survivors, Express passed Stronghold and the four US destroyers as these headed to the north. Express signalled that the action was over, but the ships proceeded to search the area for more survivors, but found none. While returning to Singapore from this search, Edsall boarded the fishing trawler sighted by Force Z that morning. The trawler was identified as the Japanese Kofuku Maru, and was taken to Singapore, where the Japanese crew was interned.

While the Japanese bombers were returning to their airfields in French Indo-China, a second wave was being prepared for another attack on Force Z, and the attack was cancelled as soon as conformation was received from Hoashi of the sinkings. On the following day, Lieutenant Haruki Iki flew to the site of the battle, dropping two wreaths of flowers into the sea to honour combatants from both sides who had died in the battle. One was for the fellow members of his Kanoya Air Group and the other for the British sailors whose display of bravery in defence of the ships had gained them the utmost admiration of the pilots in his squadron.

Churchill delivered news of the sinking to the House of Commons before 12.00 on 11 December, and there followed a full review of the situation in Malaya during the next day. The loss of the two capital ships had in essence reduced Singapore to a land base: it thus became a land fortress, something it had never been intended to be, rather than a base from which to project naval power. The Eastern Fleet spent the remainder of the invasion withdrawing its ships to Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies. The fleet was not reinforced by battleships until March 1942, when Warspite and four 'Revenge class battleships arrived. Although all five battleships survived the Japanese 'C' (iii) raid into the Indian Ocean, their service in the Pacific was uneventful and they were later withdrawn to East Africa and the Mediterranean.

Prince of Wales and Repulse were the first capital ships to be sunk solely by air power while steaming in the open sea and actively defending themselves. Both of them were relatively fast ships compared to the slower US battleships that were caught at anchor at Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, Prince of Wales was a new battleship with passive and active anti-aircraft defences designed for service against contemporary aircraft, being equipped with the advanced HACS, although it was largely inoperable during the battle.

Combined with the earlier 'Ai' raid on Pearl Harbor, this left the Allies with only three operational capital ships in the Pacific theatre: these were the US aircraft carriers Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga. However, these events did prompt the Allies and the US Navy in particular to realise the potency of aircraft, and their carriers were instrumental in the Allied counter-offensive against the Japanese.