'Stoneage' was a British supply convoy operation from Alexandria to Malta (17/20 November 1942).

The operation was undertaken as Lieutenant General K. A. N. Anderson’s Allied 1^st Army, after its delivery into North-West Africa by 'Torch', was starting its advance to the east in the direction of Tunisia, and also as General Sir Bernard Montgomery’s 8^th Army in the Western Desert was sweeping to the west in the direction of Tunisia, liberating Tobruk on 13 November and Benghazi on 20 November.

The situation for 'Stoneage' was set by a number of attempts to resupply Malta and re-stock the forces based on the island during the preceding months. During October 1942 British submarines had made four store-carrying trips to Malta: Parthian and Clyde one each from Gibraltar, and Rorqual two from Beirut. For these voyages the submarines were loaded with aviation fuel, special foodstuffs, diesel fuel and lubricating oils, and torpedoes. On 29 October the island’s improved logistical situation was reflected in the arrival of a reinforcement of Supermarine Spitfire single-seat fighters, and in the first three days of November Parthian and Clyde again arrived with important stores including aviation fuel and torpedoes.

Two attempts to send in unescorted and disguised merchant vessels failed, however. In 'Train' (ii), the 3,338-ton Empire Patrol, a 15-kt ship carrying 1,200 tons of aviation fuel and 300 tons of benzine, was routed to the west of Cyprus to Turkish territorial waters and thence to the north of Crete. On 2 November, in an area to the north-west of Cyprus, she was spotted by a Dornier Do 215 aeroplane and later put into Famagusta with engine defects, and as it seemed that the Germans were now aware of the attempt, the run to Malta was abandoned. In 'Crupper' (ii), from the west two small ships, Ardeola and Tadorna carrying animal fodder, entered the Mediterranean with the slow portion of the Algiers assault convoy. On 9 November they were stopped by shore batteries while passing Bizerte and were interned by the French.

However, the last few trips with special stores made by cruiser minelayers were completely successful. On 12 November Manxman reached Malta from Alexandria with 350 tons of powdered milk, dried cereals and preserved meat, and on 18 November there arrived Welshman from Gibraltar with similar stores, and then between 27 November and 4 December Welshman made a trip at high speed to Haifa and back to fetch torpedoes urgently needed by the submarines of the naval force based in Malta.

Preparations had been started in the eastern portion of the Mediterranean for the movement of four ships in convoy for Malta in 'Stoneage'. It was planned that the MW.13 convoy should be routed within some 40 miles (65 km) of the coast of Axis-held Cyrenaica to reach the longitude of Benghazi around dusk about 48 hours after leaving Port Said. As with the 'Harpoon' (ii) and 'Vigorous' convoy operations in the previous June, the more dangerous threat was perceived as being the surface units of the Italian navy, but on this occasion the British would not be able to call on warship reinforcement from Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville’s Eastern Fleet, and the disparity between the Italian fleet and the British surface escort might even be greater.

The Italians' total strength was six battleships (including three modern 'Littorio' class units), two heavy and five light cruisers, and more than 20 destroyers. On 11 November the 'Littorio' class ships steamed north to Naples, but this would not have prevented them from attacking any Malta-bound convoy. Offering a more immediate threat, however, was the force of five cruisers based at Messina in Sicily.

For the 'Stoneage' convoy of four merchant vessels (9,312-ton Dutch Bantam, 8,983-ton British Denbighshire, 7,939-ton US Mormacmoon and 7,101-ton US Robin Locksley), Rear Admiral A. J. Power’s British escort comprised, in total, the 15^th Cruiser Squadron (light cruisers Orion and Arethusa with 6-in (152-mm) guns, and light anti-aircraft cruisers Cleopatra, Dido and Euryalus with 5.25-in (133-mm) guns) and the 12^th Destroyer Flotilla (escort destroyers Aldenham, Beaufort, Belvoir, Croome, Dulverton, Exmoor, Hurworth, Hursley, Tetcott and Free Greek Pindos).

No one expected or even hoped that this lightweight force could check the Italian fleet for long in daylight, but the passage of the convoy was timed so that the first half of the 350-mile (560-km) stretch across the central basin of the Mediterranean between the hump of Cyrenaica and Malta would be covered at night. If the Italian fleet attempted to approach before dark, while the convoy was still off the Cyrenaican coast, it would be heavily attacked by aircraft operating from airfields in the area of Gambut, and if it waited until the following morning it would be within easy range of Malta’s potent air attack forces. It was unlikely that the Italian fleet would attempt a night attack, but any attempt to do so would provide the British light warships with an excellent chance to demonstrate their superior night-fighting training and equipment.

The convoy had to be defended not only from the Italian fleet, though, but also from air attack from Crete and, later, from Sicily. Fortunately the conditions in North Africa were very different from those of the previous June, for although the Axis air forces were still established on bases in the Cyrenaican part of Libya, they were short of fuel and constantly forced to change base as the Axis land forces were driven back. Moreover the convoy would not sail before the 8^th Army had captured, at the very least, the airfields around Tobruk, and it was hoped to be able to use airfields even farther to the west. Before dawn on the third day the convoy should be within range of Malta-based fighters.

The Royal Navy and RAF set up a Combined Operations Room at the headquarters of No. 201 Naval Co-operation Group to supervise 'Stoneage'. No. 201 Group had three squadrons for general reconnaissance, three for anti-submarine patrols (including one whose aircraft were equipped with air-to-surface vessel radar), four for the torpedo-bombing (including one with radar-equipped aircraft) and therefore capable of tackling any Italian naval elements seeking to intercept and destroy the convoy, and one for the long-range air escort role.

Air Vice Marshal A. Coningham’s Air Headquarters Western Desert was tasked with the provision of short-range fighter cover as far as 40 miles (65 km) to the west of the longitude of Benghazi, the point at which the Malta-based air units would assume responsibility. Consolidated B-24 Liberator aircraft of the USAAF were to be made available at Gambut to support the striking force from No. 201 Group, and based on Malta were one special composite squadron (photographic and radar-equipped maritime reconnaissance), one squadron and two flights of torpedo-bombers as the striking force, three long-range fighter squadrons with aircraft, and the equivalent of five short-range fighter squadrons with aircraft. Malta’s night bombers (the equivalent of one squadron) were to attack enemy landing grounds in Sicily on the night of 19/20 November to give indirect support to the convoy.

Despite the light nature of the naval escort, therefore, the chances of being able to defend the convoy from either surface or air attack appeared much better than they had in June, and at Malta there was confidence that the vital cargoes could be successfully protected during unloading.

For maximum security and secrecy, Bantam, Denbighshire, Mormacmoon and Robin Locksley were loaded at Port Sudan and entered the Mediterranean from the Suez Canal in the evening of 16 November under escort of Euryalus and seven fleet destroyers of the 14^th Destroyer Flotilla. On the following day the fleet destroyers entered Alexandria to refuel, and were relieved by the escort destroyers of the 12^th Destroyer Flotilla, which offered a better anti-aircraft capability.

At 07.00 on 18 November Arethusa, Cleopatra, Dido and Orion, as well as the seven fleet destroyers, joined the escort in the area to the north of Tobruk. Power was in command of the operation. Day and night anti-submarine patrols were provided by Bristol Bisley warplanes of No. 15 Squadron, SAAF, Lockheed Hudson warplanes of the RAAF’s No. 459 Squadron and Fairey Swordfish warplanes of the FAA’s No. 815 Squadron. On 18 November shore-based fighters covering the convoy were reinforced at dawn and dusk by the Bristol Beaufighter heavy fighters of the RAF’s No. 252 Squadron.

During the morning a small force of Axis aircraft, reported as Junkers Ju 88 bombers, attempted to bomb the convoy but were driven off by the Curtiss Kittyhawk single-seat fighters of the RAAF’s No. 450 Squadron, and thereafter the passage was without incident until dusk. With the exception of the Euryalus and the fleet destroyers, the cruisers had just disengaged from the convoy and moved to the north for the night when torpedo-bombers attacked both forces. The convoy escaped damage but Arethusa was hit forward. Heavily on fire, she was ordered to make for Alexandria escorted by two destroyers. About an hour later two torpedo aircraft attacked the convoy but did no damage.

At dawn on 19 November Power brought his night striking force again into close company with the convoy, which was making excellent progress. Beaufighter and Supermarine Spitfire warplanes from Malta gave continuous cover, and from Gambut six Martin Baltimore bombers of the RAF’s No. 203 Squadron swept the waters north of the convoy. Throughout the passage there was a marked improvement in communications between the ships and their covering fighter aircraft, resulting from the use of VHF radio-telephone sets and no doubt also from persistent combined training.

At 14.00, leaving Euryalus and the escort destroyers to escort the merchantmen the rest of the way to Malta, then only a mere 80 miles (130 km) distant, Power turned his remaining warships back for Alexandria. By 03.00 on 20 November, the convoy was safely berthed in Malta harbour, where unloading and dispersal of the cargoes began immediately in the face of ineffectual air attacks, and all was safely ashore by 26 November, much of it in underground storage.

'Stoneage' delivered 31,250 tons of supplies whose availability delayed until January 1943 the time at which Malta would otherwise have been compelled to surrender for lack of supplies. These supplies also enabled increased air and sea activity by Malta-based units. Submarines based in Malta, the reinstatement of Force 'K' (with Dido and Euryalus and the 14^th Destroyer Flotilla) and the transfer of No. 821 Squadron’s Fairey Albacore aircraft allowed increased attacks upon Axis shipping. The success of 'Stoneage' also allowed the discontinuation of the 'Magic Carpet' submarine supply runs.

'Stoneage' may be regarded as the end of the two-year Axis siege of Malta, not so much because it completely fulfilled all of Malta’s current and future needs, which it did not, but because it coincided with the expulsion of Axis forces from the coasts of Egypt and eastern Libya, facilitating the running of further convoys without significant risk and, later, a regular shorter, and therefore overnight, service from North Africa.

On the same day the 8^th Army entered Benghazi, and in Tunisia the 1^st Army was building up its strength for a further advance from a front about 40 miles (65 km) west of Bizerte. In Malta the task of unloading the four ships was completed in record time. There was scarcely any attempt at interruption by Axis aircraft, nor were there any attacks worthy of note on Power’s ships, or later on Euryalus and the 'Hunt' class units as they returned eastward.

The damaged Arethusa, however, in tow stern-first and fighting dangerous fires and a rising gale, did not enter Alexandria until the evening of 21 November, more than 12 hours after the other ships of her squadron. She had suffered 155 killed, and among the seriously burned was Captain A. G. Chapman, who had remained on his bridge until a few hours before entering harbour. The RAF had lost five aircraft. Two weeks later, on 5 December, the 'Portcullis' convoy of five cargo vessels and one tanker arrived at Malta from the east, with no interference by the Axis forces either on passage or while unloading.

Between them, the 'Stoneage' and 'Portcullis' convoys had delivered 56,000 tons of cargo, apart from heavy oils, providing the island with food, fuel and other essential supplies until at least the middle of March 1943.